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The aim of this study is to discuss the notion of embodiment in respect of Merleau 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? observational cinema. For 
this aim, this thesis dwells on the embodied nature of perception of seeing and its 
relation to epistemological approaches that understand the process of thinking and 
knowing either based on dualisms of body and mind, subject and object or 
interdependency of them. It is argued that phenomenological understanding of bodily 
experience provides a basis for the constitution of knowledge without a separation of 
thought and sensuous experience, self and other. Thus, when the cinema is 
considered as a way of thinking through images or producing knowledge via images, 
phenomenological perspectives allows us to understand filmmaking, film viewing 
and film experience in general considering embodied recprocity between images of 
???????????????and our own bodily experience in the world. Since the underlying idea 
is that language and body involve in each other within experience as being in the 
world and the body as the house of the language is the structuring structure of it by 
preceding it.  
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1. IN T R O DU C T I O N 
 
??????? ???????????? ????? ?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
visual anthropology project and so we used camera in the field as a research method. 
Learning to use a camera to depict the life in villages is only one part of the process, 
the most important side of this experience was to live with villagers for one month in 
each village and participate in their daily life. In the second vi????????????????????????
chance to observe how they relate to their environment and space that they 
experience. The old village that they had build in past was evacuated, and after that 
they began to live in another village consisting prefabricated houses. Any time I went 
to old houses with a villager or to their new houses, I had a chance to compare the 
image of evacuated buildings at that time to the memories of old village in their 
mind. After a while, I realized that not only for their relationship to architecture but 
also for their own spatial experience and consciousness, their body plays a 
fundamental role in the definition and also creation of space. I listened to their 
reflections on this old space and observe them in their new life and observed that this 
transformation resulted in atrophy in their understanding of space. This also helped 
me to see how body underlies the creation of place through the body's spatial 
orientation and movement, and its action in language, that is, how they reflect on 
their own life. The question was how I can show this to other people as a result of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
an idea. After returning to Ankara, my first reaction was to focus on the perception 
of space and I gave a thesis proposal about the role of the body in the relationship 
between space and the consciousness of place. However, I realized that the 
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fundamental problem in the field research has remained unquestioned, that is, the 
possibility of communicating of an idea by means of visual material. Therefore, I 
changed the topic and decided on studying body within its relationship to cinema. 
The thing is that my reading list has not changed except for Kant. Phenomenology 
was still in the center. S???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
separation of body and mind, subject and object, that is internal and external, I 
focused on his philosophy and other theories turning around it concerning the film 
???????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
by saying that I cannot understand my bodily experience in the world without 
referring my body. It seems like a tautology but it is not, when we reflect on our 
??????????? ??? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ????? ???????? ?????? ?????? ???????????? ???????
convincing us to believe that self and the world have separate beings. Thus, the 
subject can easily believe that the reality external to him can be objectified and so 
accepted as completely knowable and translatable into knowledge as if it is a 
transparent process of mind corresponding to the object external to it. As if my body 
is like a silent container of this knowledge. The thing is that as the history of 
documentary cinema showing us that film is a product of the interaction between 
subject and the filmmaker, perception and expression of this perception as 
knowledge cannot be understood by ignoring the reciprocity between them as well. 
In the same way as seeing is not prior to other senses; mind is not prior to body 
considering thinking, understanding and language. Experience precedes language. 
This point is my connection to film as an expression of experience. Thus, my thesis 
aims to reveal how the visual language that tries to produce knowledge visually in 
the case of observational cinema is rooted in our embodied experience in the world. 
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For this aim, I tried to examine views that separate mind and body, and Merleau 
???????? ????????????g of embodied perception in order to compare them first and 
then I emphasized on the embedded phenomenology in observational cinema by 
showing the connection between them. By this way, I showed that visual material 
can be a way of knowing, however, we should rethink and redefine what we 
understand of perceiving the world and thinking on that perception. It is not that only 
the mind is active when we are thinking visually or linguistically, body underlies all 
this process since our first encounter with the world is a bodily experience. Finally, 
we can say that visual material has the capacity of describing this encounter more 
than the ways of thinking based on textual tradition.   
 
????? ???????????? ?????? ??? ???? ??????? ??? ????????? ??? ???? ???????? ??? ???? ???????nship 
between perception and meaning via concentrating on three different areas of 
discussion on vision: ocularcentrism, phenomenology of perception and 
observational cinema. This engagement will evolve around three notions; body, 
image and perception that will allow us to explore the claim of observational cinema 
on the surface, but the problem of embodied epistemology in depth. In the following 
chapters, firstly, we will focus on the criticisms of Cartesian basis privileging of 
vision in Western thought and discuss the perspective that subordinates sensuous 
experience to mechanisms of intellect. By this way, we will refer to the problem of 
the relationship between vision and knowledge. This discussion as the core point of 
the thesis will help us to identify the difference of phenomenology in its 
understanding of epistemology and vision than other perspectives in the history. 
Thus, we will be able to have a better understanding of philosophical basis of the 
theory of embodied visuality and its resonance with corporeal image in observational 
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cinema. On the other hand, this will bring into question the problem of the 
interference of text with image in visual anthropology in respect of that visual 
materials are reduced to signs, symbols and other domesticated meanings. Secondly, 
??? ????? ????????????????? ???????? ??????????? ???????????? ???? ??????? ??? ?????????
perception considering the relationship between perception and body. M. Ponty is a 
distinctive figure in phenomenology tradition by razing acknowledged subjectivity 
rest upon thinking with binary oppositions such as body and mind. From the 
perspective of newly revived phenomenology, subjectivity constitutes a mutual 
permeability and mutual creation of self and other. The theory of embodied visuality 
takes this as an example for cinema spectatorship in which self and world enfolds 
and it is an intensified instance of the way our perceptions opens up onto world 
(Marks, 2000:149). In respect of its resonance with phenomenology, I will focus on 
??????? ??????????? ???? theory exploring the embodied relationship between 
spectator and film and so the act of film viewing from a phenomenological 
perspective. Thus, this will provide the basis of third section in the thesis. In this 
section, we will show in which ways the form of seeing examined throughout this 
thesis relates to other senses and how it turns out to be an agency of whole body. 
Under the light of these concepts of embodiment, observational cinema will be 
examined in rest of the thesis. By way of this attempt, we will see how observational 
cinema deals with the problem of meaning production while intersecting it with 
visual sources for the sake of scientific knowledge. We will study in which points 
theories of embodied perception and visuality purified from dichotomies resonate 
with the idea of corporeal images presented by observational cinema.  
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???? ????????? ??? ????? ??????? ??? ????? ????????? ??? ??? ???? ??? ?????? ????? ???????? ????
separation of internal and external, body and mind, subject and object. 
Correspondingly, meaning is produced by whole body not only by conscious 
thought. In other words, meaning is not constituted only by intellectual conception; it 
embodies sensuous experience in the act of whole body as well. Images carry the 
imprints of body as corporeal images tell us, that is, they are the replications of the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
this reason, images have a character transcending linguistics. Hence, the sensuous 
experience can give the knowledge of it. This transcending character is constituted 
by our bodily being in the world without a separation of senses and intellect.  
 
How can cinema be closer to understand the lived experience of the body? To what 
extent can the viewer relate to the image? These questions are significant for this 
thesis in that the corporeal conditions of seeing underlie artistic creation and 
scientific concern about other. Grasping this foundation will help us to reformulate 
and maybe displace the questions about their methodologies and techniques. The 
problem of vision is discussed within film theory as well as philosophy along with 
the debate on subjectivity. It is not the aim of this thesis to give an account of how 
????????????? ????????????????? ????????? ???? ??????????or ideological reflections are. 
Neither to trace back all conceptions of vision throughout the whole history of 
philosophy and itemize them all. What we are concerned about here is the problem 
of whether embodied visuality can provide a new epistemology in its own right and 
in this case within from observational cinema. To that end, we will focus on 
theorizations within observational cinema offering an insight into a philosophical 
debate. 
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2. D ISE M B O DI E D E Y E 
 
 
 
In Aleph, our fictional writer Borges (1998) puts forth his intentionality towards 
Beatriz with the desire of an unchanging self that he sets against the changing 
universe. This is the gist of the relationship between his love and the infinity. The 
???????? ????? ??? ???????? ???? ????? ????? ??????? ????? without a change is like it is 
guaranteed only with an unchanging self without consulting to God. Identified with 
infinity, love embodies an infinite here and now. The eyes seeing Aleph have such a 
self that it is the one keeping its unity within time, flowin?? ?????????? ????? ????
attributing itself an externality with at least its spatial distance to Aleph within space. 
????? ????? ?????? ??????? ??????? ??? ???????? ?????????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ure or confusion, all 
?????????????? ??????????? ????? ??????????? ??????? ?????????? ??????????????????? This 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
at once, from the deserts of equator to the bones of a hand. Referrin??????????????????
????????????????????????????multum in parvo?????????????????????????????????????????????
a question of mathematics: ????? ??? ???? ??????? ??? ?????? ????? ???????? ???? ???????? 
(Borges, 1998: 144) The fact that this simultaneity is improbable to express because 
??? ???? ??????????? ?????? ??????????? ??????? ???? ??? ???? ?????????????? ??? lining of the 
units of an infinite index, which the mind comprehends at once by attaining a bodily 
??????????? ?????? ??? ??? ????????? ??? ?????? ????????? ??????? ??????????? ??? ??????????
????????????? ??? ?????context, Borges encounters a reality that intellectual is unable to 
express through language since the language divides the absolute grasped by 
intuition all at once. However, ?????????????????????????????????????????????????nt from 
??????????intuition (2004) because everything happens in the space; that is, it exists 
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with a materiality transcending the mind. In Aleph, Borges is on the basement floor 
??? ??????? ???????????? ??????? ???? ????? protagonist of the story, and he sees 
everything with its spatio-temporal existence from a hole. After all, this is the 
astounding thing for him; a huge incision that is opened up in the middle of the 
consciousness ??? ???? ?????? ???????????? ?????? ????????? ?????? ??? ????? ?? ??????????
meaning. Seeing is an event that carries spatio-temporal materiality, which the daily 
conscious experiences ???????? ????????? ?????? ??????? ??? ???? ?????????? ???? ???
intuition. Borges both experiences an enworlded seeing and he puts himself as a 
??????????? ??? ??????????? ???????? ??? ???? ???????? ?????? ???? ????? ??????? ?????????
themselves in me as though in a mirror; saw all the mirrors on the planet and none of 
?????????????????????(1998:145) This self, which is not reflected on mirrors, is thus 
presented in a dual relationship that has a separate existence from the thing he looks. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in the position of spectator against the object. Seeing as a perception still seems to be 
reduced to physical and/or psychological processes and all that secrets Aleph 
bestows remain to be mere images offered to the understanding of the intellectual. 
However Borges, as res cogitans, still discovers another thing about perception in the 
impossibility of the thing he sees;  
The enumeration, even partial enumeration, of infinity?is irresolvable. In 
that unbounded moment, I saw millions of delightful andhorrible acts; none 
amazed me so much as the fact that all occupied the same point, without 
superposition and without transparency. What my eyes saw wassimultaneous; 
what I shall write is successive, because language is successive. (1998:145) 
 
This time his eyes are also amazed at what he has seen. This point of view is, beyond 
its judgment about language, the product of this view: things in the world are 
perceived within their relational existence but Aleph in this sense offers an exception. 
It appears in an almost Newtonian absolute space without including the relationship 
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between things. It is a postulation of the space which is understood as separate from 
the things. Each object is infinite because they can be seen from all angles in the 
universe. Aleph operates as a machine that turns internals into externals; things 
display all their internality, now they are seen as things in themselves. Seeing thus 
gains a contradictory meaning in the story; Borges experiences a seeing practice 
through his being in the world and he depicts the material conditions of this event in 
his story but the thing he has seen is quite different from his own world. If we 
compare these two worlds, while on one side there is an existence within 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
an unbound world and a seeing on the other. However, the interesting thing is that 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
providing a vision including all points of views. If being unbound from the world 
means to be ????????????? ???????????own body, why does the encountering of an 
abso????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
becomes absolute as a separate self from its relational existence in the world, that is 
being in the world. Eyes are almost like windows to the world and seeing is a 
????????? ???????? ????? ????????? ???? ??????????? ??????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ??? ??? ?? 
consider the reverse, eyes absorb the external to the inside as being transparent, 
wholly permeant.  What recognizes the perceived thing and constructs the world of 
meaning ??????? ??????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
the thinking self. Even if ??? ??? ???? ????? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ????????? ?????? ????? ???
encountering with ideas, the result does not change much. There is something 
thinking behind my eyes and my eyes can only be a medium of this thinking. It is as 
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???????????????????????????????????????? got a surface. It is as if I am talking about an 
infinite power that I am carrying in a finite being. It is a lambent, a mechanism that is 
scanning the surfaces of the things when it sees them ???? ??????????????????????????
itself. Like an unreflecting mir?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
touch with things, is defined. The eyes are reduced to the organs that provide data to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
they see is guaranteed by the things they have seen before. The role of the memory is 
to fasten this operation and get rid of the undesirables. Like what Borges says in 
Aleph????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
through the tragic erosion of ????????????(1998:147) Maybe it is not hard to conceive 
the whole, but it is difficult to keep it in mind. The thing astonishing Borges is the 
possibility of all the sights of the World to be seen in Aleph that his body cannot see 
from a limited point of view though he attributes an absolute self to himself, which 
vanishes when it is considered in the perceptual world. The emphasis on forgetting 
points at the fact that human beings are in the world and they will comprehend the 
world by being in the world. It is impossible to reach a competence where everything 
is conceived in an instant and the objects can be seen in every angle. Then, what 
makes us be in the world? 
 
2.1. Ocularcentrism in Western Thought 
 
Philosophy is known to be developed in parallel with astronomy in ancient 
times. These are the times we constructed our knowledge about the universe based 
on the observations of celestial phenomena just visible to the naked eye. The 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ning of 
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this perceptual seeing itself, that is, doubting about appearances of things and paying 
attention to the ideas behind them.  This was of course a beginning of a new epoch in 
which the reliability of sense data will be questioned and made distinctions between 
form and matter, appearance and reality as basic philosophical problems along with a 
strong belief in mathematical explanation of the universe. This refers not only an 
epistemological transformation but also means to talk about the ontology of the 
????????????? ?????????? ??????? ???????? ????????? ???????????????????? ????? ???????? ???
The Republic (1974) exemplifies this view; the light coming out of the cave is the 
light of the world of forms and the shadows reflected by the fire on the walls in the 
darkness of the cave are the objects in physical world. The eyes are condemned to 
see these shadows in the cave and philosophical enlightenment arised from the 
realization of the real light outside of the cave, that is, the knowledge of the forms 
and prisoners are unchained. The visible world and intelligible world are separated. 
The thing that my eyes see in the visible world is not the true reality but an illusion. 
The universal reason behind eyes provides the knowledge of reality beyond the 
perception associated with beliefs and imagination. Beliefs as commonsense are 
based on accepting the reality of sensory perceptions without the knowledge of their 
causality. The link between true knowledge and opinion derived from visible world 
??? ???????????? ??? ???????????? ??? ?????? ??????? ?????????? ???????????????? ??? ????????
through a comprehensive education of mathematics. Therefore, sensory perception 
becomes an object of examination of science by opposing the reason. Mathematics is 
the Aleph of empirical knowledge in the sense that everything can be clearly seen 
from every point on the universe systematically by the eyes of reason and this 
????????? ??? ??? ????? ?????? ???????? ??? ???????????? ????? ??? ?????????? ??? ?????????????
becomes the door of the truth enlightened by the reason on the edge between the 
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visible and the invisible worlds. ????????????????????????????????????????? ????????
?????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
he deals with the significance of light as a metaphor for truth in western metaphysics, 
?????? ????? ???????????? ??? ?????? ???????? ???? ?? ???????????? ??? ???????? (1954:30) 
Beyond their metaphorical value, Light and vision basis the conception of truth, 
which reaches its widest sense with enlightenment, in the history of western thought 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of Sun outside of the cave and the light of the fire inside of the cave. The light 
coming outside of the cave is an image of which illuminates and disclosures the 
intelligible world. Seeing this light is the metaphor of seeing the invisible within the 
visible that is, seeing the forms behind the physical things through these physical 
things. Whereas the things, which are seen by human perception in the visible world, 
are merely illusions, the forms are true visions, which are seen and recollected by 
????? ???????????? ?????? ??????? ??? ???????? formulation becomes an expression of the 
nature of truth or an opening to a transcendence that leaves behind the physical world 
and its history. Therefore, vision is transformed into a world, which no more 
????????????? ??????????????????????????? ?1961) criticism on the history of western 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????dea 
???????????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
originates in the conception of seeing as a model for thought. ????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????eidos, idea and theoria are based on seeing:   
The word idea means that which is seen in the visible, the aspect it offers. 
What is offered is the appearance, eidos, of what confronts us. The 
appearance of a thing is that wherein, as we say, it presents, introduces itself 
to us, places itself before (vor-stellt?????????????????????????????????????? ?
is present, i.e., in the Greek sense, it is. This standing is the stability of that 
which has emerged from out of itself, of physis. But from the standpoint of 
man, this standing-there of the stable and permanent is at the same time the 
surface of what is present through itself, the apprehensible. In the appearance, 
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the present, the essent ?Seiende?, presents its what and how. It is apprehended 
and taken, it is the possession of an acceptance, its property (Habe), it is the 
accessible presence of the present: ousia. This ousia can signify both: the 
presence of something present and this present thing in the what of its 
appearance (Aussehen). (1961:154) 
 
???????? ??????? ??? ?????? ????????? ??? ??????????????????? ?f presence. The important 
thing is here the visibility of idea, which already exists as a priori, that is, before our 
experience in the physical world. David Michael Levin (1993) points out that this 
interpretation of ocularcentric generation of the idea refers to a common nature 
underlying of both rationalism and empiricism though they are different lines of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????? 
According to empiricism, all our ideas either came directly from perceptual 
experience or are at least connected to ideas, which do have a direct 
perceptual origin. Thus, the idea is, in the most literal sense, an abstraction 
prized a way from the perceptual object that is its source and referent. An 
essent (Seiende) appears, presenting a face, an aspect. What is seen, 
perceptively, is a surface the sensible qualities of which constellate, in their 
abctraction from the object, an eidos, an idea of what the appearing object is. 
According to rationalism, however, the idea is always a prototype, 
paradigmatic for perceptual experience; it is the source of the possibility of 
perceptual experience and the referent for the illumination of the meaning 
that the perceptual object is given. (Levin, 1993:197) 
 
According to Platonism as a rationalist tradition, ideas are eternal and they become 
reference point for perceptual world by having ontological priority. Thus, seeing as a 
component of human perception is removed from the area of thinking and 
knowledge. As Heidegger (1961) points out, eidos and idea suggest two opposite 
reality and the visible world is ensured by the ideas that can only be seen by the soul. 
Thus, seeing means to the light of reason and seeing as sensual perception is blinded 
under this light. The correlation between understanding and seeing as exemplified in 
Platonism forms a basis for ocularcentric ways of thinking in the history of western 
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thought. In The Life of the Mind, ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
formal philos?????? ????????? ???? ????? ???????? ??? ??? ?????? ??? ????????? ????
predominance of sight is so deeply embedded in Greek speech, and therefore in our 
conceptual language, that we seldom find any consideration bestowed on it, as 
though it belonged among things too obvious to be noticed???(Arendt, 1978 as cited 
in Levin, 1993:2) This basis which is subjected to discussions on ocularcentrism 
today not only gives priority to seeing among all other senses but also privileges the 
reason rather than sensuous experience. This results in an epistemology originated 
????? ??????? ??? ???????? ??? ???????? ??? ?????? ???????? ????????????? ???????? ???? ?????
dominated by an ocularcentric paradigm, a vision-generated, vision-centered 
??????????????? ??? ??????????? ?????? ???? ????????? (1993:2). Nietzsche who is one of 
???????????????????????????????? ?????????? ??????????? ???????? ???????????????????????
criticism of metaphysics of presence. In The Genealogy of Morals, (1956) he brings 
into question seeing in its literal meaning and philosophers in the history of western 
philosophy have a look, which is independent from our experiences in the world, too 
abstract and theoretical for him. Thus, they seek for constructing a scientific and 
philosophical language alienated from their being in the world as Heidegger points 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
direction, to abrogate its active and interpretative powers?????????????? ?????? ?????
?????????? ????????????????????? ????? ???????????????? ??? ???? ????? ????? ?eeing is about 
human perspective but also to the problem of philosophies understanding the world 
independently from their senses and sensibility. Seeing which is blinded under the 
light of reason aims to objectify the world and make it absolutely knowable. Foucault 
accepts that thinking originated in seeing permeates into modern hegemony of 
vision, modern technology and modern forms of governmentality. (Levin, 1993: 21) 
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This does not simply imply that surveillance cameras surround us, but to the 
underlying idea of that the power to see means to power to control. For him, 
hegemonic vision is transformed into the cogito in modern episteme. As Flynn states 
????? ????????? ??? ???? ???? ????? ?????????????????? ????????????? ?????? ???? ????????
Greeks, became the language ??????????????????cogito and in the politics of possessive 
???????????????? ???????? ?????? ????? ?????????? ??? ??????????? ??????????????? ??????
separates mind from body, knowing subject sees only with the eyes of mind, which 
has a perfect symmetry with the all-seeing-eye of the God, contrary to bodily seeing 
????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
2.2. Cartesian Understanding of V ision 
  
In the context of illusions, Descartes (1994) agrees with Plato in questioning the 
beliefs bas??? ??? ?????? ???????????????? ?????? ???? ??????????? ??? ???????? ?????? ??? ????
?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is accepted that this vision is destined to make the reality all-present until it has no 
unrepresentable aspect. Even if the ways of making the being all visible has been 
????????? ??????? ???? ????????? ???? ?????????? ??? ????????????? ??? ?????????? ????????
unchanged. There are two opposite sides which are the reality existing independently 
????? ???? ???? ??? ?nchanging self-examining this reality. This view underlies the 
claim of seeing the world clearly. ?????? ???? ??? ??????? ?? ????????? ?????????? ???
nineteenth-century histories of painting and visual arts; inspired by Italian 
Renaissance painting and its tradition, critics and historians found it easy to see art 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????(Shapiro, 1993:130) 
???? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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the help of technology for the sake of this ideal. This tendency is complemented with 
the historical discourse. To make all the occurrences in the world a part of the history 
is to make them visible. All the textual or visual mediums that try to illuminate the 
world coincide about the problem of representation. However, it is obvious for 
Descartes obsessed with having clear and distinct ideas that the mind is already 
????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????(Pragmatism, n.d.) The idea of the genuine, geometrical order of world 
assumed in Cartesian method and optics agrees with the absolute perspective 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the complicity of the viewer in the scene beheld are excluded from this attempt to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????(Shapiro, 
1993:130) Thus, seeing is reduced to a mechanistic process, which makes the owner 
of these eyes a passive bearer of it whose subjectivity is already given by reason 
schematizing the world. Cartesian doubt rejects ocular vision since the perceptual 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
history; he relegates seeing for the sake of the autonomy of reason by changing the 
definition of seeing and develops a mechanistic, physiological, and geometrical 
account of vision. In his book Eye and Mind (1993) writes that Descartes relies on 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????and so decides 
to construct the visible according to a certain model-in-???????????????????????????? 
In this sense, it seems essential to trace discussions on ocularcentrism back to 
Descartes for undermining the thoughts which shape the modern world. Seeing is left 
in ambiguity within the inter-textual discussions on ocularcentrism. Seeing has a 
privileged position along with a philosophical and cultural hegemony, however, what 
kind of seeing is that we are talking about? Is our problem the privileged position of 
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seeing? Or does what is meant by seeing as it is defined within these discussions 
bother us? In this regard, ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Descartes suggests, that modern technological subjectivity rests not so much on the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????(1993:88) 
An inquiry of what Descartes understands by thinking and seeing indicates that they 
cannot be understood independently from changing definitions of subjectivity in 
modern thought. From Plato to Descartes, the relationship between perception and 
thinking is established via mathematics that is transcending its object. This is related 
to both the ontology of the object and the constitution of the subject. In respect of 
theory of knowledge, Dewey (as cited in Houlgate, 1993:87) points out that the 
relationship between subject and object has been always problematic and he claims 
that the reason of this problem is the form of thinking and theory of knowledge 
oriented by seeing ?????? ???????? ??????? ??? ?????? ????? ??? ??????????? ??????? ???
???????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ??? ???????????????
knowing and so the consciousness seeking for the essence or form of the object can 
objectify it without any intervention. This atrophy of object rooted in the superiority 
of theoria to practice in ancient Greek ?????????????????????????????????????????????
is independently real??? (Houlgate, 1993:87) By the privileging of a spectatorial 
vision in knowledge, to place subject in a position of spectator is analogous with 
reifying the object in a spatial distance that means to prior spatial existence of object 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ??????????? ??????? ??? ???????????? ?????????? ??? ????? ??????? ???? ????????????
understanding of the world that provides the correspondence between the reality 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
operates and participates in generating the knowledge. If it is accepted that all the 
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knowledge emerges from experimentation, then the object of knowledge will not be 
fixed with ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????? ??? ????????? ???????? ???????????? ?ield we are working, be it physics, 
????????????????????????????????????? (Dewey, 1960: 23-214)   
Heidegger criticizes this objectifying gaze, too. According to him, a pure theoretical 
?????????? ??? ????? ?????????? ??? ??????????? ???? ????? ????????? ????? ???? ??ginning 
?????????? ???????? ????????? ?Sehen) as the mode of access to beings and to being??
constrains the virtual existence of the things that generates differences and replaces it 
????? ????? ??????????? ??? ????? ??? ??????? ???????? ??????? ???? ?die Einförmigkeit des 
puren Vorhandenen????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
itself, without (apparently) any intrinsic relation to any space of awareness or 
disclosure. (Houlgate, 1993:91) To assume an object there present before my eyes or 
the eye of mind in the sense of conceiving the being as given means already to 
attribute objectivity to it. This is to look at the world from the perspective of Aleph 
????? ????????? ???? ???? ????????????? ??? ??????????? ????? ??? ????????????? ?????? ?????? ????
Heidegger. The conception of being as objective as placed before oneself has 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? To see the picture 
provided by Al?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ??? ??? ???????????? ??? ???? ???? ???? ??????? ????? ?????? ??? ???? ???????? ??? ???? ???? ???
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
constant????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
an image but in the sense that Things exist as placed before us, as objective and as 
present to us apparently. There is nothing mysterious or confusing about them, the 
 18 
only task to do for the mind is to name the apparent properties of the present object. 
On the other hand, such objectivity demands a conception of subjectivity as the 
bearer of its own existence, as able to authorize what is to count as present and 
?????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ???? ????????????? ??? ??????????? ??????????????? ??????? ?? ????-unconcealing 
??? ???????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????
??????? ???????? ???????????? ???? ???? ?????????? ???????????? ??? ???????????? ??????????
????????? ?????????? ???????? ????? ???? ??????? ???????????????????? This 
???????????????????????????????????????equating knowing with mastering the world by 
accepting objects as available objects (Vorgestellt) at hand, can be overcome only by 
the openness to the way of being not to the being, which is thought to be the ultimate 
ground of life or the absolute being beyond the beings in the world. Thus, to be 
??????????? ??? ???? ????????? ??? ?????? ??????? ???? ??????? ??? ??????????????? ????? ????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
??????????? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ????????? ????? ??? ????????????? ???????????
?????????? ??????????? ???? ??? ???? ???? ?????? ??? ???????? ??? ????? ???? ???????? ???? ???
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that is, to be already situated in the world. We understand the world in our 
?????????????? ??? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
?????????? ????? ???????? ???? ??????? ??? ????????????? ??? ?????????? ??? ???????????
philosophy maintains the objectifying and mastering gaze of the knowing subject for 
Heidegger.  
 
Although M. Ponty (1993) as another phenomenologist in 20th century agrees with 
?????????? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ???????????? ??????????? ??????????? ????? ????????? ??? ??
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vision-?????????? ????????? ??? ??????????? ??????? ???? ????????? ???? ???? ????????ying 
????? ??? ?? ??????? ??? ????? ?????????? ??? ??????????? ???? ???? ??????????? ??????? ??? ????
??????????? ??? ?????? ??? ???? ??????? ??????????? ?????????? ???? ????? ????????????
?????????? ?????? ?????? ??? ??? ?? ????????? ?????? ??? ???? ??????? ????? ??? ???????????
Descartes for his false conception of seeing from which ocularcentrism arises, he 
undermines the mind-body dichotomy first as the foremost figure in his philosophy. 
Descartes confines all the beings to a mental schematism that proves the scientific 
attitude estranging human being and the things around him/her by making inner 
?????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
???? ??????????? ??? ???? ??????? ????? ?????????? ???????? ??????? ???? ????? ???? ??? ?????
constructions of things to get back into the world, as Heidegger holds that for the 
Pre-Socratic science the being was thought to open itself to the minds open to it. (M. 
Ponty, 1993:1) ????????? ???? ??????? ???????? ??????? ???????????????? ???????? ????
????????? ????????? ???????? ??????????? ???? ??? Cartesian model of thought contributes 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? theoria as pure seeing in Greek 
???????????????????????????????????????????????int Descartes conceived the world as 
being in front of my eyes, M. Ponty remarks that my eyes are in the world rather than 
confronting the world as against my presence into it, that is, things are not in front of 
me as an objective reality but they are aro????????????in the world. For M. Ponty, to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
live it; human experience as the combination of mind and body starts from this point 
so my knowing activity, too. He compares artist ?especially the painter- with 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
????????????????????????????????????????????? (M. Ponty, 1993: 2) The encounter of 
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the painter with the world does not resemble scient??????????????????????????????????
with models of things in his/her mind. According to this differentiation, the 
????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????anding of vision under 
such concepts considering his background in phenomenology tracing back to 
?????????? ?????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
??? ????????? ??? ??????????????? ??? ??? ?????????? ??? ????????? ????? ????? ???? ????ghts 
purified from lifeworld. This is what disembodiment of human vision is.  
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3. E M B O DI E D E Y E 
 
 
In the first chapter, we tried to explain that the ways of thinking, which give priority 
to seeing, are nourished by the discontinuity between mind and body that reaches its 
peak with Cartesian philosophy and that at the same time seeing is subordinated to 
mind by being reduced to a kind of mechanical process through mentioning 
ocularcentric ways of thinking. In the second chapter, we will dwell on the new ways 
of seeing and thinking by emphasizing the phenomenological approach, which can 
be suggested as being on the opposite side of these views.  We will touch upon the 
???????? ????????????????????????????? ??????????????? ??? ?????????????? ?????????????
????? ????? ??? ??? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ?????? ????????? ???? ??? ???????? ??????????? ??????
conceives the relationship between seeing and thinking within mind and body 
continuity. Then, we will try to understand how this view forms a tool for 
understanding visuality by paying attention to the theory of embodied visuality 
which is gained by phenomenonology.  
  
3.1. Phenomenology of V ision: Maurice M . Ponty  
 
M. Ponty, in his almost every work where he mentioned seeing and thinking, 
criticized at l????? ???? ????? ???????? ????? ??? ?????? ???????? ?????? ??? ???? ????????
classical science, even when he talks about painting in his book Eye and Mind 
(1993), which becomes prominent with his references especially to Cezanne. 
Science, says Ponty, re-forms the generality of things with the models it takes out 
from the things, as if the world is a laboratory of the things that need to be explained 
before our eyes, and then attributes these constructs an absoluteness which is 
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independent from the things. The relations??????? ????? ??????????? ???????????????? ???
the thought of the object in general, with the world of experience, does not go 
beyond just an encounter from distance. It also brings along the faculty of 
manipulating things at the same time (M. Ponty, 1993: 5-6) Knowing, through which 
???????? ???????? ????? ???? ?????? ??? ?????????? ???????? ????? ???? ???? ????? ????? ????????
closedness can only be understood by con????????? ???? ???????? ??? ??? ????? ??????? 
understanding which acknowledges these constructs as given realities. M. Ponty sees 
this as a problematic in the ways of thinking, which are penetrated into the 
methodology constructed on the basis of the observer and the observed dualism, and 
therefore a problematic in the ways of seeing.  Then, it is necessary for us to re-
evaluate and re-learn how to see. The world is exactly what we see but the thing is 
whether we match the thing we see with the knowledge or not. Ponty says that it is 
hard to learn this without understanding the knower and how to know, or in other 
words without knowing the act of seeing itself or the perception in general (M. 
Ponty, 1968: 4) Although M. Ponty leaves this task to philosophy, his criticism is 
????? ??? ??????????? ??? ???????? ?????????? ????????? ??? ??????????? ???? ????? ??? ????
philosopher Ponty says by emphasizing the relationship between words and things 
that knowing is not to produce verbal substitutes which will replace the world. On 
the contrary, 
It is the things themselves, from the depths of their silence, that is wishes to 
brings to expressi?????? ??? ???? ???????????? ???? ????? ???? ??? ???????? ???????
with the vision we have in fact, to correspond with that, in that vision, 
provides for thought, with the paradoxes of which that vision is made, the 
only way to adjust itself to those figured enigmas, the thing and the world, 
whose massive being and truth teem with incompossible details (M. Ponty, 
1968:4) 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
he primarily starts presenting his view by negating the illusion or the dream 
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arguments of the past, which question the things we see. He suggests that if we did 
not know what the right thing was once, we would not have known the wrong one 
and if we can speak of the wrongness of the dreams we should have the experience 
of the truth (M. Ponty, 1968:4-5) The experience of the truth for him is my being 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????? ????????????????????????? (M. Ponty, 1993: 7) The fact giving me this 
certainty of the knowledge of what being in the world means comes neither from the 
naïve idea of being in itself nor the correlative idea of a being of representation; 
rather a being for the consciousness comes from a being for man. That is, I am facing 
neither an object, whose existence is wholly determined by its being in itself and 
whose intrinsic properties are known by the pure thought, nor a poor appearance of 
which I own only the reflection, that is the representation of it. However, science 
constructs its object exactly on these presuppositions. Science, from the very 
??????????? ?????? ???? ????? ???? ???????????? ???????? ?????? ??????? ??????? ??? ?????????
overview that is tangent to the world and this causes science to work by conceiving 
an absolute subject and object beyond all the variables and relativities. The scientist, 
against this inarticulate skeleton structure on which he can work through modeling 
on, establishes himself in the position of the absolute spectator. Because this 
perceptual faith occurs ??? ???????????? ?? ????? ???? ???????? ???? ????????? ????????????
internality and externality and when it places perception into the subject, the 
perceived becomes the physiological manipulating reason for the perception which is 
wholly independent from the subject. As from the developmental process of 
perception, perceptual faith impels me into developing the beliefs that firstly my 
perception goes to things themselves, that is it gives me the sensation of a flesh and 
bone concrete physical reality, and that secondly the perception exists when it is 
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sensed, that is perception is mine and that I can perceive on condition that my organs 
exist. However, according to M. Ponty, perception is something that is both inside 
and outside of me. This mutuality of perception which does not contradict in direct 
experience, when science reflected and verbalized, has created two poles: a 
perceiving subject on one side and a perceived object on the other. Because modern 
epistemology, by taking this belief a step further, has created the ontology of the 
being in two different fields, which are objectivist attitude and subjectivist attitude. 
In the end there appeared an understanding of perception that is completely based on 
constructs. However, the problem is that science, by forgetting that this is a 
construct, is not conscious of the fact that it works with the presupposition which 
perceptual belief takes with. It attributes them an ontological reality. In this respect, 
the objectivist attitude understands sensation as a sum of certain qualities of the 
object of knowledge. The purpose is to save the object and its perception from all 
uncertainties and make it knowable. According to this, perception is over and done 
with and knowing subject re-establishes the process of perception by taking it into an 
analytical analysis; now he is constructing the ontology of the object which he takes 
before himself. All the data of the object that are its knowable and primary qualities 
in general, which is the data that can be mathematized, have become the reality of 
the object. On the other hand, in the subjectivist attitude, the sensation of the object 
is the clashing of the impressions, as a point and an instant effect, with the object 
outside. Here, most of the work belongs to the mind because it is the one measuring 
the consistencies of the objects outside. When the sensation is understood in this 
way, it becomes the field of absolute terms, not of the relationalities. Mind is a self-
evident entity; its relationship with the object is determined not with the 
determinations of the object but with the unifying power of reason.  
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In the light of these criticisms, M. Ponty in his book Phenomenology of Perception 
(2006) accuses subjectivism and objectivism for ignoring intentionality of the 
consciousness. Intentionality is briefly the fact that the consciousness is always a 
consciousness of something. Consciousness cannot be understood as a thing-in-itself 
but it has the faculty of reflecting on itself. Thus, phenomenology on a point, which 
is in contrast with the understanding of self-evident subject in Western history of 
ideologies, establishes the understanding of being on the constant relationship of the 
subject with the object. The opposite view refusing intentionality, which M. Ponty 
?????? ??ntellec?????????? ????????? ??? ?????????? ????? ???????????????? ???? ???????? ????
properties coming from experience insufficient it searches for a priori conditions of 
experience, it puts its idealism not to the object but the subject this time and 
establishes its understanding of knowledge with regard to the same conception of 
sense. Looking from the eye of the philosophy of science, we witness the fight 
between the pure subject and the pure object. The understanding of consciousness, 
where the world is seen as disclosing in perception, is the common point that the 
tradition of Husserl and M. Ponty meet. This common approach opposes to the 
classical epistemology, which sees the world as a world free from all the 
ambiguousness and consisting of pure and absolute objects. Knowledge is not the 
compiling of certain aspects of the object. Science, having idealized its object, 
constructed its subject with the same artificiality. Science, with the knower subject 
which is free from his being in the world, has moved away from the life-world that 
Husserl (1970) emphasized, has lost its reality and it has almost been reduced to 
??????? ???? ???????? ???????????? ???? ?????????? world loses its reality which is 
equivocal, is suspended, slippery and is open to be determined by the context. M. 
?????????????????????????? 
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Scientific thinking, a thinking which looks on from above, and thinks 
of the object-in- general, must return to the "there is" which precedes 
it; to the site, the soil of the sensible and humanly modified world 
such as it is in our lives and for our bodies?not that possible body 
which we may legitimately think of as an information machine but 
this actual body I call mine, this sentinel standing quietly at the 
command of my words and my acts (M. Ponty, 1993: 2) 
 
 
Here with the e??????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ??? ?????? ???????????? ??????????? ??? ???????? ???? ????????? ?????????????? ???
?????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
Husserl is that he presents the impossibility of a wholly philosophical reduction. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the transcendental ego. However, according to M. Ponty, inhabitance in the world is 
not an encompassing idea that will consist of all the ideas; that is, it is not a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
eye view and construct it. Rather, M. Ponty in his book The Visible and The 
Invisible, (1968) tries to reunite the internal with the external, the consciousness with 
the world. According to him, if we understand what the body is, it is not hard to 
reunite consciousness with the world because these two are actually interdependent, 
the phenomenological description of the body teaches us this:   
 
The body unites us directly with the things through its own 
??????????????? ??? ???? ????? ???? ??? ??????? ???????? ??? ??? ?? ????
dimensional being, that can bring us to the things themselves, which 
are themselves not flat beings but being in depth, inaccessible to a 
subject that would survey them from above, open to him alone that, if 
it be possible, would coexist with them in the same world (M. Ponty, 
1968:136) 
 
 
In the understandings of seeing, M. Ponty puts forth spatiotemporal dimension of 
????????????????????????????????????????????-dimensional universe and continues on 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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to this depth, I experience things at certain distances but both inside and outside 
myself at the same time and the possibility of this takes M. Ponty to a new ontology: 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
step further, separates the existence and thought of existence from each other and 
says that existence itself is just the totality which incarnate consciousness 
prepossesses. This pre-??????????? ?????????? ??? ???? ????????????? ?????????
inseparability and unity before the consciousness reflects by turning on its own act 
???????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
nothing will be knowable and thinkable. That is, he describes a state of 
consciousness which exists before language without the language; this consciousness 
means the unmediated relationship of the body with the world.  
 
The flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance. To designate it, 
??? ??????? ????? ???? ???? ????? ?????????? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ????? ???
speak of water, air, earth and fire, that is, in the sense of a general 
thing, midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a 
sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there 
is a fragment of being. (M. Ponty, 1968:134) 
 
Thus, M. Ponty makes the intelligible ideality and sensible, between which exists a 
huge gap in Platonism, closer to each other and emphasizes on the fact that they are 
made of the same fabric: 
Visible and mobile, my body is a thing among things; it is one of them. It is 
caught in the fabric of the world, and its cohesion is that of a thing. But 
because it moves itself and sees, it holds things in a circle around itself. 
Things are an annex or prolongation of itself; they are incrusted in its flesh, 
they are part of its full definition; the world is made of the very stuff of the 
body. (M. Ponty, 1993:3) 
 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the body, one that makes us be in a multidimensional world here and now, one that 
gives the being a thickness. As a means that provides our setting up a relationship 
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with the world, flesh is a thing to which ideality is not alien but on the contrary to 
which this ideality brings itself a depth, axes and dimension. That is, it is defined as 
the idea as the invisible of the visible (M. Ponty, 1968:152) According to M. Ponty, 
phenomenological field is not a state of the consciousness, not a psychic 
phenomenon; that is, it is not a kind of reflection of the external world into the 
internal world but is on the contrary a state of intertwining of the two. This is the 
intertwining and reversibility of the sensate and the sensible. He establishes the 
ontology of the flesh in the details of perceptual faith, which exists in the pre-
reflective level, with the example he gives on the basis of touching and seeing. The 
moment that will enable subjectivity happens when my right hand touches my left 
hand. The encroachment between the touching and touched includes an immanent 
reversibility instead of a dualism. Therefore, my body that I can touch can never 
feels at the same time ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
two that is not grasped in the direct perception; there is a noncoincidence between 
????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the rank of touched, but then its hold on the world is interrupted, or it retains its hold 
??? ???? ??????? ???? ????? ?? ??? ???? ??????? ?????? ???? ???? ??????? ?????????? ????????
touching and touched are not the two different layers of being in the world and that 
they are reversible, body has the capacity of being both the perceiving and the 
perceived. This means that we cannot touch to ourselves or to another body without 
recognizing our tangibility or the fact that we are touchable by others. Thus, we 
understand that every differentiation made in the context of the artificial seperation 
between the touching and the touched in the history of philosophy until now 
disregards this spontaneity experienced on the pre-reflective level and the spatio-
temporal simultaneity and understands our being in the world via dualities. In a more 
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accurate way, it disregards our being in the world and approaches to the world from 
????????????? ??? ??????? ???? ????????? ?????????? ??? ???? ???????? ?????????? ?????????
embodied subjectivity that M. Ponty presents exists neither in the tangibility of the 
body nor in its touch only, rather it appears thanks to the intertwining, the chiasm, of 
these two sides, on the point where these two overlap. This is also an emphasis to the 
fact that the chiasmic relation does not bring an identity because the touching and the 
touched are never the same thing; they cannot be reduced to each other. M. Ponty, by 
emphasizing on the chiasmical relationality between them, breaks up the dualities of 
mind and body, self and world, and idea and sensible and associates them with the 
embodied flesh, suggesting that:  
Does not mean that there was a fusion or coinciding of me with it: on 
the contrary, this occurs because a sort of dehiscence opens my body 
in two, and because between my body looked at and my body looking, 
my body touched and my body touching, there is overlapping or 
encroachment, so that we may say that the things pass into us, as well 
as we into the things (M. Ponty, 1968:123) 
 
This encroachment emphasizes on the fact that the world has the capability of 
changing us as well as our capability of changing it. There is mutuality; that is, the 
understanding of a subject who has the chance of making choices and whose 
rationality is prioritized remains behind for Ponty.  
At this point,  it is needed to understand better what is said so far about touching in 
order to understand seeing, which is the subject of this thesis, because Ponty says 
that there is also a kind of encroachmental relationship between these two.  
We must habituate ourselves to think that every visible is cut out in 
the tangible, every tactile being in some manner promised in the 
tangible, every tactile being in some manner promised to visibility, 
and there is encroachment, infringement, not only between the 
touched and touching, but also between the tangible and the visible, 
which is encrusted in it, as, conversely, the tangible itself is not a 
nothingness of visibility, is not without visual existence. Since the 
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same body sees and touches, visible and tangible belong to the same 
world (M. Ponty, 1968:134) 
 
 
Then, we are not talking about a situation for Ponty where seeing is prioritized over 
touching or other senses and even thinking and feeling. He refers to the chiasmical 
relationship of the senses. He says that touching and seeing are not superimposed but 
at the same time in experience they cannot be separated with precise boundaries from 
each other. The thing making them meet on a common point is body, which is in a 
reversible relation with the world thanks to the embodied flesh.  
 
Just as the sensuous comes from a common source, the source from which the seeing 
and other senses come is the same pre-reflective unity. When I reflect on the pre-
reflective unity of the perception, all the elements of the perception which I feel 
densifying at certain locations on my body become an inseparable unity in my direct 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????edge between 
the visible and the invisible, as boundaries transcending each other, as the 
reversibility of external and internal and as modes of flesh. From this point, we can 
conceive seeing in M. Ponty better. Because we hold a view about the ontology he 
constructs through not producing seeing from within but through starting from the 
seeing, the senses. He describes this idea in his book Eye and Mind well: 
 
The enigma derives from the fact that my body simultaneously sees and is 
seen. That which looks at all things can also look at itself and recognize, in 
what it sees, the "other side" of its power of looking. It sees itself seeing; it 
touches itself touching; it is visible and sensitive for itself. It is a self, not by 
transparency, like thought, which never thinks anything except by 
assimilating it, constituting it, transforming it into thought?but a self by 
confusion, narcissism, inherence of the see-er in the seen, the toucher in the 
touched, the feeler in the felt?a self, then, that is caught up in things, having 
a front and a back, a past and a future.... (M. Ponty, 1993: 3) 
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Thus, by emphasizing that body is perceiver and also perceived and this is the 
condition of perception, M. Ponty rejects the views that separates subject and object. 
Now we can clearly conceive on what kind of ontology he bases his criticism of 
??????????? ??????????? ??????? ??? constructed on the similarity between the object 
outside and its the mirror image as the reflection of this external object; it is only an 
external denomination, it belongs to thought. (M. Ponty, 1993: 7) The relationship 
between these two is again an external causality and mind already has this causality 
as a model-in-thought. The thing that Descartes sees is only an externality, not a 
flesh (M. Ponty, 1993:46); it is the idea which constructs the similarity between the 
image and the mechanics of the object and is also this idea whose relationship with 
the body is broken.  
Vision is not the metamorphosis of things themselves into the sight of them; 
it is not a matter of things' belonging simultaneously to the world at large and 
a little private world. It is a thinking that unequivocally decodes signs given 
within the body. Resemblance is the result of perception, not its basis. Thus, 
the mental image, the visualization which renders present to us what is 
absent, is a fortiori nothing like a breakthrough to the heart of Being. It too is 
a thought relying upon bodily indices?this time insufficient ones?which 
are made to say more than they mean. Nothing is left of the oneiric world of 
analogy.... (M. Ponty, 1993:8) 
 
The object constructed with intellectual images is defined with the externality of the 
object. Then, these images are the substitutes of the objects that show space where no 
space exists. However, according to M. Ponty thinking is not enough for seeing 
because vision is a conditional idea, it emerges via the thing happening on the body 
and it is pushed by the body to thinking (M. Ponty, 1993: 55) We can suggest that 
thinking for M. Ponty starts in the first relation we establish with the world. 
However, it has not recognized itself yet. The moment when it realizes this, it tries to 
formulize the thing experienced and theorizes it. The problem in Western 
metaphysics is the fact that we are mistaken by presenting the constructs, which we 
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have theorized from our experiences with the world, as the reality itself. It does not 
matter whether these constructs move from within internal to external or from 
???????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
separating the two from each other. When Descartes was saying that the laws of the 
mind exist in nature, he implies that judgments come before the senses. However, it 
is a matter of construction of the perception within the judgment but this construction 
is not a priori to the perception but arises from it. In the sense, there remains some 
part which cannot be reduced to being the perception of the object, as it is in the 
irreducibility of the biological realities to mathematical physical variables. 
Therefore, Descartes reduces seeing to a mere mechanistic operation by conceiving it 
according to a model-in-thought.  
 
3.2. Embodied V ision and Its Epistemology  
 
Phenomenology proposes understanding the existing perceptual conditions before 
this object is constructed by science. On the other hand, by perceiving these 
conditions as intellectual entities either as independent from the thinking self or as 
the a priori conditions of the experience, the objectivist point of view constructs its 
object with an approach that is not condemned to a subjective point of view. In this 
respect, objectivity is seeing the object from all the points of view. It is also the 
reason for the eye, the look and the seeing occupying a privileged place in 
epistemology or the formation of the idea since the understanding of that an object is 
purged from its temporality and given with its spatial coordinates is dominant. The 
only sense which is able to solve these geometric codes is the eyes because the eyes 
are the windows from where a given rationality opens to externality. And their only 
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task is to perform a physical operation and function only as a conductor. Science is in 
search for Aleph, the all-??????????????????????????????????????????????being as thing-
in-itself. However, according to M. Ponty, the beliefs that our perception is over in 
objects or in non relativistic realities, along with the understanding of truth 
independent form the subject, arises from the natural attitude which we produce in 
perception that is our primary relationship with the world. In the history of thought, 
the biggest step of reality like the one abovementioned is the discovery of the idea 
that human mind is able to reach truth independently from its object. M. Ponty draws 
attention to the fact that a looking factually without a perspective is not possible in 
perception. My b????????????????? ???????? ???????????? ??????????? ???????????????
from one angle. Ponty describes seeing with two aspects of it: its spatiality and 
temporality. The phenomenological field where looking emerges appears primarily 
within a figure-ground relation. When my consciousness, which always exists as a 
consciousness of something, is directed at an object, the ground becomes vague. 
Because I experience this process from one point of view that my bodily existence in 
the world brings along, internal horizon of the object becomes clear when my 
looking is focused on the object; thus, I can discover it from different perspectives 
???? ????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
ability to see the object from different points of view and to synthesize all the sights 
operates depending upon my ability to do???????????? ??????before my ability to think. 
Another thing for the differentiation of this object from the other things around it is 
its external horizon. Things existing in the external horizon of this object also watch 
this object along with me. The seen and the unseen will always remain as the two 
different faces of perception. Therefore, I think that I can perceive this object, which 
I perceive as differently from other things, by putting my looking into angles 
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different than mine although I do not see it from all angles. My tendency to think of 
the object which is not actually seen since it exceeds a certain point of view, in other 
words, as the thing-in-itself or the objective reality seen from infinite perspectives is 
supported by the fact that my looking can put itself to everywhere and replace all of 
the objects, that is, the spatiality of look. ????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????hesis that generates a feeling as if we can sum up 
all the perspectives provided by mobility of the body in the present moment??????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? of holding the 
past and foreseeing the future, provides the content of perception being embedded 
into the time between the past and the present. Owing to the temporal horizon, my 
perception is no longer a factual now that flies away and it becomes a point of 
objective time which is constant and identical. However, this synthesis not only 
constructs the invariability of the content of perception but also brings a visibility 
from all temporal perspectives, a fictional eternity. Thus, the thing-in-itself which 
can be seen from all perspectives becomes a thing that can be seen from all times. On 
the other hand, my relationship with other is primarily a spatial one since on the level 
of my bodily feelings and intentions I face it as a matter ?????????????????????????????
with another. The other is another I since I know that I can replace it, thus I know 
????? ??? ??? ????? ?? ?????????? ????????? ???????? ???? ?????????? ????????? ??????? ????????
being visible from all angles, it has finally been made a total of a set of qualities by 
the empiricists. These qualities are thought as things existing permanently against a 
look that arises from nowhere. And this takes us to the construct of the thing-in-itself 
which we cannot escape. However this state of disregarding the condemnation of the 
body to a point of view is actually the b????????????? to be pushed to a position of a 
mere object among other objects. In this way, the way for subject-object distinction 
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is paved for. The thinking self is separated from the living self and the living self 
turns into a cover around the knowing ego. In this respect, M. Ponty proposed an 
?????????????? ????????? ????? ?????????? ??????? Lebenswelt ????? ?????? ??? ???? ??????
????????????????????????????? ??????? ???? ????????????????? ???????? ?? ????? ???????? ????
returning the transcendental bases of his philosoph?? ??? ???? ??????????? ??? ????????
existential phenomenology, meaning is in every situation a combination of subjective 
and objective experience. And this synthesis can never be understood by 
differentiating the body from its lived experience. However, Husserl accepts the fact 
that the essence of the things caught up in the conscious experience with the 
transcendental reduction, which is the last level of the phenomenological inquiry, is 
universalized with a total bracketing of the existence. Ponty refuses this idea. 
According to him, with the concept of intentionality Husserl revolutionized in the 
Western thinking, which objectified the consciousness as a thing-in-itself, but he 
equals subjectivity to intersubjectivity and makes it objectively available to any 
existence thus the concept of Lebenswelt contrasts with the notion of universal ego. 
Intentionality, the fact that the conscious is always a consciousness of something, is 
an invariant correlative structure of the acts of the conscious but this consciousness 
always belongs to an embodied subject rather than a disembodied and transcendental 
subject. Because it is embodied, existence is lived, situated and in motion all the time 
and thus always produces unfinished relationality. This materially and historically 
situated and finite lived-body subject is condemned to meaning since the 
consciousness exists as an intended flesh as long as the body lived. This is a 
continuous disclosing and completing process of the meanings and thus these 
meanings are experienced in a state of disclosure that I attributed to my body and 
made it mine. The thing forming the unity of the meaningful experience is not the 
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??????? ?????? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ?????? ???? ???? ?????? ?? ???????? ?????? ??? ???
perceptively subjective and it engages with the world owing to its objective 
???????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
Every perception is a communication or a communion, the taking up or completion 
by us of some extraneous intention or, on the other hand, the complete expression 
outside ourselves of our perceptual powers and a coition, so to speak, of our body 
with things???????????????????????Thus, perception should be understood my being 
in the world that provides me to reach to the world rather than being a total of the 
senses or a psychic phenomenon, since the expression of perception is the gesture of 
the perception.  
From its first breath, the lived-body constitutes both an intrasubjective 
and intersubjective system in which being is both understood and 
signified as significant -that is, as intentional. In that every lived-body 
is both the subject of perception and expression and an object for 
perception and expression, every lived-body lives the commutation of 
perception and expression in a simultaneously subjective and 
objective modality. And because intentionality is articulated in 
existence through the agency and activity of the lived-body being-in-
the-world, every conscious lived-body is semiotically and 
hermeneutically component in its ability to commute perception to 
????????????????????????????(Sobchack, 1992:41)  
 
Language, according to M. Ponty?? philosophy, can not be understood as the subject 
of the linguistics or by separating into syntaxes and semantics. The body itself with 
its being in the world is the one that constructs the basis for language. Language and 
communication do not emerge since my body is an instrument of the perception; it 
has already been communicating with the world due to its own structure since my 
body in itself is actually perspectively and intentionally engaged with the world. The 
perception itself is already an experienced expression. In the highest level of 
expression there is speaking, then is writing but it is experienced in the body before 
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that. The body is not a transparent transmitter of the ideas that these speeches include 
but is on the contrary the source as the producer. In this respect, M. Ponty says:  
 
??? ?????? ??????? ????? ???????? ??? ????????????? ??? ????? ????? ????
experience of perception is our presence at the moment when things, 
truths, values are constituted for us; that perception is a nascent logos; 
that it teaches us, outside all dogmatism, the true conditions of 
objectivity itself; that it summons us to the tasks of knowledge and 
action. It is not a question of reducing human knowledge to sensation, 
but of assisting at the birth of this knowledge, to make it as sensible as 
???? ?????????? ??? ???????? ???? ?????????????? ??? ????????????? ???????????
1964b:25) 
 
 
These sentences refer to the fact that analyzing the perception shows us how it forms 
the basis of significance and semiosis as the field of experience in other words as the 
world of consciousness before putting itself ??? ?????????????????????????? ????? ??????
the world which the consciousness expresses to itself. Thus, it tells us that language 
is not a thing that can only be understood in the relationship of signifier and 
signified, that the relationship between the two is always mediated with the body and 
in this way it forms a multi-layered unified system of differences. If body did not 
exist, then the thoughts would not exist. Thus, in order to understand the thoughts 
and their ways of being formed, we need to look at how the relationality of the body 
with the world, which starts in perception, is constructed. Then, how will a kind of 
knowing that the thoughts existing on the basis of this bodily existence may cause be 
constructed by the existential phenomenology? First of all, it is clear that M. Ponty is 
not worried about reaching the essence of the things, which can be understood as 
their being in themselves.  According to him, there is a three-level reflection process 
possible: the phenomenological description, the phenomenological reduction and the 
phenomenological interpretation. Firstly, we focus on the pre-reflective perception 
that is the immanent unity of the body with the world in the living world, what is 
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immediately present to our consciousness. We focus on the perceptual faith 
mentioned above, which is our natural attitude and we bracket it. Here, the function 
of bracketing is not to ignore the natural attitude in the next level but to see its place 
and function within our experience from a reflective distance. Our presuppositions, 
which do not exist in the pre-reflective level but which we own when we start to 
reflect on our experience, are included in the natural attitude. This reflection here 
shows us that the world continuously exceeds my perception and also all of the 
expressions that I produce on my perception, which means that a description of the 
phenomenological world is not a process that can be completed. That is, it is not 
possible for me to make a whole reduction, in contrast to what Husserl states. In 
short, the field of experience is a continuity whose definition always slips from my 
hands. Thus, the road departing from the understanding of the world of the things-in-
themselves to the reality of experience is such a complicated one. On the other hand, 
with this description I learn that the pre-reflective embodied experience, which 
existed before speaking and reflecting, is the basis of my all reflections and 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ???? ??????? ??? ???????? ??? ??????????? ????? ????? ?????????? ???? ????????????? ??????
inte??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ??????????? (Sobchack, 1992:44) In this way we get to understand that 
language is as embodied as the one speaking it because we do not produce words to 
substitute reality by speaking but conversely we expand the enworlded experience 
and move the body beyond its situated state. Secondly, we thematize the 
phenomenon by reflecting on the consciousness itself to identify the structural 
existence in a particular embodied consciousness. The way of this kind of reflection 
??? ??? ???? ??? ????? ???????????? ?????????? ?????? ??????????????? ????????? ??? ????
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phenomenon within the whole and that allows for comparison and contrast of the 
phenomenon with other phenomena like and alike it, a pattern of experience 
emerges, and with it emerges also the shape of the phenomenon as it is intended in 
???? ???????????? (Ihde, 1974 as cited in Sobchack, 1992: 49). What this level will 
teach us is that all our judgments we produce on our conscious experience and our 
conventional vocabulary, which we use for the expression these judgments, are 
embodied in our pre-reflection existential speaking. Lastly, phenomenological 
interpretation allows us to understand the meaning, which is the intentional 
correlation between consciousness and the phenomena in the particularity of the 
lived-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and thematized consciousness is clarified and we find the embodied value 
relationship between the?????? ????????? ??????? ????? ????? ????? ??? ??????????? ????
describe before you start interpreting, before you analyze and theorize, before you 
abstract???????????????????The reason for a short inclusion of these methods here is 
to clarify how all our existence is embodied if we are to look at the world with the 
phenomenological method. Phenomenology, in this sense, develops a different way 
of knowing along with presenting a different ontology. Because the subject of this 
thesis is the role of seeing in acquiring knowledge, we are coming closer to 
understanding the conditions that makes seeing embodied and the potential of this 
situation to change our point of view in terms of knowledge. It is not an easy process 
to obliterate a deep-rooted epistemological tradition, which tries to understand the 
phenomenal world by separating the thought from the body. Moreover, here we will 
try to examine what this subject in terms of the film experience means. When 
considered also in terms of film theories, the situation regarding the creation of 
problematic dualities is not much different from the problems existing in the 
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understandings that have formed the Western history of thought. We believe that 
phenomenology will help us to find ways to overcome these problems on one hand 
and help us to understand and describe the existential and emotional sides of the film 
experience beyond a semiotic analysis done through sticking to the texts on the other 
hand.  
 
When considered within the scope of the understanding of perception given in the 
previous two chapters, it is seen that vision contrasts with the understanding of vision 
which is handled in ocularcentrism. The understanding of perception exemplified 
with M. Ponty above all differs with the understanding of sensation that the classical 
science puts against rationality?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
object seem to be two different poles escaping continuously from each other with a 
Cartesian separation and science on the other hand seems to be continuously in a 
hurry to fill in this gap. However, existence in M. Po????????????????????????????????
for its intentionality and the connection between the two poles is set up from the 
start. After all, we are talking about an existential experience in that subject and 
object cannot be separated from each other. If seeing is considered in this sense, 
vision as a modality of perception has a gestalt structure and is in common with 
perception in its intentional nature. Vision is intentional due to its structure. It always 
acts in correlation with an object, it is always seeing of.   
 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
directed in function. It informs embodied existence as a finite and yet 
reversible motility. Thus, the movement of existential vision acts to 
diacritically differentiate and mark the visible from the invisible, the 
figure from the ground, the seen from the seer; and yet it also acts to 
transform each to the other or inform each with the other (Sobchack, 
1992: 86). 
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Invisible side of the experience forms the basis for the visible but not as a formal 
condition but as also determining its content. We can say that invisible is not a result 
??? ?? ??????? ?????????? ???? ??? ??? ??? ?????????? ??? ???? ?????? itself. Therefore, when 
seeing things, we are in an act that structures the world as well as obeying a 
???????????????????????????? ?????????? ?????????? ???? ??? ??? ???????????? ???????????? ????
semiotic choice in which the visible is inscribed in that syntagmatic combination 
??????????????????????????????????????selection from the invisible, those paradigmatic 
possibilities ???????? ??? ?????????? ??? ?????????? (Sobchack, 1992:87) Considered in 
terms of spatiality and temporality of perception, we mentioned that internal and 
external horizons of the objects are disclosed through vision. However, this horizon 
does not only point to a physical process but also processes the gestalt structure in 
terms of the world of meanings. According to this, we do not discover a given reality 
existing outside of us by going towards it; we are in an act of continuously 
constructing and selecting the meaning of the world for us. After all, the invisible 
always accompanies the visible. Then we can say that although the seer can fix the 
things that s/he saw in the visual field, on the edge between the visible and the 
invisible, with now, this now both includes the past that determines the intentions 
and the future that is foreseen. My body is a fold as both spatially and temporally. 
What makes vision existential is the fact that it always embodies the unknown as 
already being a fold. M. Ponty, for this reason, calls vision and the act of viewing as 
??????????? ??? ??????????? ?? ?????? ???????????????? ???????? ??????? ???? ???? ???? ????????
itself in the pre-reflective state of experience??? ?????????????????????????????????????
mentioned before, is not yet aware of the fact that it is the one seeing, that is when 
the unseen is not directed to the originator of the act in a way as how a baby or a cat 
sees the world, the vision merely intend to the seen world. Their vision is only from 
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within experienced.  However, just as the consciousness has a structure of returning 
back to itself and thinking about it, vision also returns back to itself and recognizes 
?????????????????????????ts dominant and natural directedness toward the visible world 
????? ????????? ????????????????????? ????????????????????????????? ??????????????????? 
(Sobchack, 1992:88)  Thus, vision transforms into my own vision breaking apart 
from anonymity and invisibility, and the consciousness finds its origin in my 
subjective body that saves it from this anonymity. This is what M. Ponty calls as 
???????? ??? ?????????? ????? ???? ???? ??????????????? ????????? ??????? ??? ????-subject and 
becoming personal. We observe here that the consciousness functioning operatively 
??? ???????? ????????? ???? ????? ??????????? ???????? ????? ???? ???? ????????? ??? ?????
reflective and reflexive turn expresses itself in perceptual existence as the 
deliberative intentionality that emerges from a body lived a?? ?? ???????? ?????????
(Sobchack, 1992: 98). In this way, vision not only provides us the access to the seen 
and unseen world but at the same time it provides us to see ourselves as both the seer 
and the seen, as visual subjects. Then, at this point it is worth to remind the point that 
is continuously repeated throughout this thesis: vision has a central role at the level 
??? ????????????? ??? ???? ????? ???? ???? ?????? ??? ??? ???????? ??????????? ???? ?????
understanding of vision is experienced not as a product of a movement from an 
??????????????? ??? ???? ??????? ???? ??? ??? ???? ??? ??????? ?????? ???? ??????? ????? ????????
above all it will be the product of the mutual relationship of the internal and the 
external.1 Self is both positing and the posited. That is, it is the subject of the vision 
so ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????(Sobchack, 1992: 99). At 
                                                 
1 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
mirror phase but that image is something coming from out of my body.  
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the same time, self is not a transcendental thing as a product of a Cartesian 
questioning or as a product of a judgment of only the mind by breaking up from the 
sensation. Self, a thing understood rather than a thing-in-itself, emerges in its 
relationship with the empirical world. Seeing leads to speaking; it is open to see the 
world by recognizing itself and expressing the things it sees at a higher level. With 
thi??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the arguments of this thesis. Thinking is a process starting in the body, not a thing 
that starts and finishes in the mind. It bears the traces of the relationships established 
with bodies and this reflective act is rewriting, speaking and rethinking of the bodies. 
We see, think and express the experiences with the other and this will always be 
filtered from the self as being the embodied subject.  
 
3.3. Phenomenology and F ilm Experience 
 
The phenomenological approach that M. Ponty presents has taken the attention of 
film theoreticians and especially the spectatorship studies since the 1980s. However, 
it can be stated even today that Hollywood cinema and even commercial films 
changed their relationships with the senses, and even they are so devoted themselves 
to create new bodily codes in the scale of desire politics that they produce, the 
approaches concerning bodily experience still have a very limited appeal within film 
?????????????????????????????????The Address of the Eye (1992), which is focused on 
in this thesis, is one of these rare studies of body. Sobchack, in this sense, was our 
focus since she presented a wide scale study that would be helpful in understanding 
film experience in terms of its relationship with language and thinking, in other 
words, since the context of the thesis is not only the relationality of seeing with other 
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senses and sensuous experience of cinema but also its epistemological position in 
social sciences as we will see in the next chapter.  When she started her studies about 
phenomenology, Sobchack suggests that film theories are under the influence of 
mainly two views: psychoanalysis and neo-Marxism. These two theoretical 
paradigms worth appreciation in terms of understanding the productive function of 
language between the psychic and the social life, that it brought in a new horizon to 
structuralism. However, according to Sobchack, these theories remained lacking in 
understanding the experience in its embodied conditions although they made the 
internal and external processes of the human experience come closer to each other. 
The experience they define is not the embodied experience I live as mine. In this 
respect, the following words from Sobchack worth quoting: 
A libidinal theory of the subject based on sexual difference and 
unconscious, pre-rational experience, psychoanalytic theory has 
performed its own sexual objectifications that mutilate the 
simultaneous integrity, mutability, and sensuous materiality of the 
lived-body subject and dissect, abstract and fetishize certain body 
parts as if they had a life of their own, as if they determined or were 
the whole of a person. A rational philosophy of history grounded in 
objective, concrete, social praxis, contemporary Marxism (if not 
Marx) has neglected the pre-reflective, pre-rational, libidinal life of 
the body-subject and has elided certain experienced aspects of 
concrete praxis ???????? ?????????? ????????? ???????????? ?????? ???
obscuring the sensuous materiality of the lived-body subject and by 
????????????? ???? ????????? ????????? ?????????? ??? ?????????????? ????
????????????????????????????????????????????? (Sobchack, 1992: xvi)  
 
 
Her ????? ??? ???? ????????? ???? ???????? ???? ???? ??????? ???? ?????? ??? ??????????
signification and significance in the experience of vision as an embodied and 
????????????????????????????????. (Sobchack, 1992: xvi) According to he????????????an 
express???? ??? ??????????? ??? ????????????? (Sobchack, 1992: 3) M. Ponty uses the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ?????? ??? ???????????????????? ??? ?????????? ?? ?????? ??? ????????? ?? ?????? ???
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meaning, or a wild meaning, an expression of experience by experience, which in 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
reflective experience is the side of the experience that has not been verbalized or 
expressed in written language yet. Phenomenology tries to describe the experience 
but this description is something starting with reflection. The consciousness puts this 
??? ???? ????? ??? ???????? ????????? ??? ??????????? ??? ???????? ?????? ??? ???? ????????
??????????????? ??? this sense, language can constrain the experience into a limited 
universe because the experience can get caught to the habituations or the 
institutionalizations of the reflective knowledge, but experience flourishes owing to 
language. This incomparability leads us to find new ways to express our experience 
better and refresh our language. Phenomenological description can be one of these 
ways for Sobchack since it introduces us a new language constituted by the 
immanent unity of our experience with the world, that is, ??????????????????????????
of perception and expression, with the sensuous contours of language, with meaning 
and its signification born not abstractly but concretely from the surface contact, the 
fleshly dialogue, of human beings and the world t??????????????? ?????? ??????????
(Sobchack, 1992:3) ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
this reversibility can also be applied to the film experience. The semiotics here is not 
a linguistics that reifies the subject but it is the catching of the speaking subject in the 
act of speaking. If the body-subject intends to the world as the expression of its 
intentionality, then it signifies this intentionality; that is, the human body becomes a 
source of the communication even because of a reason that arises from its physical 
existence. When trying to understand the film, it is like we are expressing to 
ourselves a thing that we have already known. Sobchack talks about a pragmatic 
language of embodied existence that is common to filmmaker, spectator and to the 
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film itself. The film perceives as I do and the common characteristic of the 
perception coming fr??? ???? ??????? ?????????? ???? ??? ???????? ??? these two bodies, 
they are both the embodied subjects that try to express their perception by intending 
toward the world. They differ in their material but for ?????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-in-?????????
as the formalist film theories accept, which is a sole bearer of the meaning from the 
construction of the film, nor it is a purified transparent window to the world from its 
subjective extensions as the realists accept. In epistemological terms, this brings us to 
the same mistake, which M. Ponty criticizes as we have mentioned before, that 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
respectively. Film should not be understood merely as a visible object. Film is also a 
viewing subject that has intentionality and that performs the act of viewing. 
Spectator views the film but at the same time the film also views. It is both the seer 
???? ???? ??????????????? ???? ????? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ?? ????? ????? ????? ???????? ???????
merely contains sense, significance, and meaning. Rather, it possesses sense by 
???????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
It is this signifying subject that it existentially comes to matter as a significant object, 
that is, can be understood in its objective status by others as sensible ??????????????????
(Sobchack, 1992:23). Just as my body is both the subject and object of vision, then 
film is. Just as my body does not exist only as an object among the objects in the 
world, then film is not an object that can only be viewed. That is, both the film and 
the spectator is embodied and also mutually enworlded. They both have unique lived 
??????? ???? ????????????????????? ??????? ?????????? ??? ?????????????? ?????????????????
perception visually realized as viewing-view and visibly expressed in the production 
of a viewed-??????(Sobchack, 1992:261). It is not to say that a film is a subjective 
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one because it is produced by a subject. Even this view still presupposes the film as 
only an objective object of vision. Rather, this means that the film also has a lived 
????? ???? ????????? ???????????????? ??? ?????????? ????? ???? ????????? ????? ????? ????? ??
reflex of developing a reflection intended to their pre-reflective experiences. Thus, 
?????? ???? ???? ??? ?????????? ???? ?????????? ??? ?????? ?????????? ??????? ?????????e, 
generalizing and using their lived-bodies and concrete situation in the world to 
imaginatively prospect the horizon for the future projects and possible situations and 
to re-??????? ??????????? ????????????????? (Sobchack, 1992:261). Sobchack terms 
this tr??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
housed in a situated body experienced as mine and yet always also able to extend 
??????? ??? ?????? ????? ????? ??? ????? (Sobchack, 1992:261). The contemporary film 
theory turns the spectator into a passive body and turns the film into a mere 
disembodied visual screen by making a Cartesian differentiation. Thus, the meaning 
becomes something coming out of the screen, taking the spectator under its influence 
and alienating it. When considered in terms of the spectator, there is most likely 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ??? ?? ???????????????????? ???? ?????? ?????????? ??? ?????????? (Joan Copjec, 
1983: 43). Thus, the film turns into an apparatus that the ideology, which causes a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
made on the determining role of the film between the psychic and the social but it is 
the turning of the spectatorship into an unintending body-object because the 
autobiography of the lived body-subject, which determines its whole intentionality, is 
left out of the theater???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
expression of this perception, and then the spectator erroneously takes this invisible 
one as his own perception. However, here the fact that the embodied beings are 
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??????? ??????? ??? ???????????? ??????? ??? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ???????? ?????? ????? ???? ??????
giving vision its thickness is the subjective experience as being the invisible side of 
vision because my bodily existence continuously informs me about how and what I 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
vision as my own, but I take it up in my own, ???? ??? ??? ????????? ??? ??? ?????
(Sobchack, 1992:271). Sobchack in her book The Address of the Eye, sets up to 
describe the film experience by using the method of the phenomenological reflection 
and describes the bipolar but the transitive relationship between the spectator and the 
film.  
???? ???? ?? ????? ??????? ??????????? ???? ???? ??????? ??????? ????????? ????
rather a hospitable host, allowing this other visual address temporary 
residence in my visible address in my body. My visible hospitability 
however, in no way denies my own visual address, my own 
possession of the premises we both presently share so as to 
significantly negotiate meaning. Thus, although generally I appear to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
or argues with ???????????????????????????????????????????????aged to 
do so by the form of her discourse, I am nonetheless actively engaged 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
performance with my own (Sobchack, 1992:272). 
 
If we look from this point of view, the assumption of the contemporary film theories 
that liken the spectator to a blank page on that is written by the film comes to 
nothing. Sobchack describes film experience in such a way that I may see what my 
guest sees in the sense of the visual address of the film?? ???? ??? ????????? ??? ???
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????? ???????? ??????? ??????? ??? ????? ??? ?????? ?????? (Sobchack, 1992:272). 
Thus, my address and the film???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
am here with my own body. Or it can be in this way that while the guest is talking I 
may interrupt and comment on it as the ?????????????????????????????????? or outside. 
Or maybe I can focus on my hunger because I am not interested in the thing my 
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
things in normal life. What determines out directedness and interests is something 
our being in the world and the style of our bodily existence determines. I see or do 
not see what my guest sees but still there is a mutual absorption and one way or the 
other they both experience a mutual experience that will unite the visible and its 
significance. Moreover, the only thing I perceive does not have to be the only thing 
????? ???? ????? ??????????? ??? ???? ????? ????? ??? ????? ??????????? ?? ???? ??????? ???? ???????
expressive activity and perceive that. The thing here is our understanding the 
relationality existing between my perception ????????????????????????? and the list of 
these variables can be extended. However, it is important to understand this point; 
the identification of the spectator is not his replacing himself into any thing in the 
film. The identical thing there is the spe??????????????????????????????????????????????
same intentional object. Thus, in the film experience example my vision forms a dual 
layer. Here, subjectivity in the dialogic experience in the film experience is lived 
????????????????????????????????????????ion both intrasubjectively and intersubjectively 
??? ???????? ??????? ??? ???????? ???????????? ???? ??????????? ??? ???? ????-subjects 
(spectator and film) capable of perception and expression through speech or vision is 
a dialectical as well as dialogical process ??? ?????????????(Sobchack, 1992:274). At 
this point, if we are to see the body with an acceptation that it is in an activity 
awakened with all its senses, there appears a multidimensional meaning of this 
emphasis. The thing is not the integration of my bo????? ??????????? ????? ????????
??????????????participating wholly to its experience. Because we know from M. Ponty 
that the sense of seeing is not separate from the other senses and all the senses inform 
each other within the embodied experience. Along with each of them having a 
difference unique to themselves, they provide the unity of the flesh in the wholeness 
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of experience. It is not possible to differentiate them with certain lines in the pre-
reflective experience which is grounded in the life-world. Touching, taste, smell and 
others all feed seeing and vice versa. According to M. Ponty, the biggest evidence of 
this mutual experience lies in understanding the semiotics of bodily gesture: 
 
The sense of gestures is not given, but understood, that is, seized upon 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
this act clearly without confusing it with a cognitive operation. The 
communication or comprehension of gestures comes about through 
reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others, of my gestures 
and intentions discernible in the conduct of other people. It is as if the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
which I witness, outlines an intentional object. This object is 
genuinely present and fully comprehended when the powers of my 
body adjust themselves to it and overlap it. The gesture presents itself 
to me as a question, bribing certain perceptible bits of the world to my 
notice, and inviting my concurrence in them. Communication is 
achieved when my conduct identifies this path with its own. There is 
mutual confirmation between myself and others (Merleau Ponty, 
2002: 97) 
 
In this sense, for M. Ponty the relationship we establish with the world is above all a 
mimetic one. The gestures which ???? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
the communication between others and me, thus, the communication does not mean 
an artifact of language system but it embodies a meaning within the life world. Since 
I do not conceive my perception of other as separated from its intentional project, 
gestures creates an intersubjective commonality between two bodies. Thus, this is 
not a mimetic process that is based on merely the relationship between copy and 
model; rather it is creative process that necessitates my body continuously to adjust 
the things around in its relationship to the world. Understanding the body, as the 
common ground shared with the others, with its gestures is important for us to 
understand the constructive characteristics of the intersubjective relations between 
me and the others. Sobchack accepts ????????????????????????????????????????????????
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experience. Within this framework, this study of the film theory may be inspiring for 
understanding the lives of other bodies and cultures, which we will dwell on in the 
next chapter, and understanding the observational cinema, which is regarded as 
within the documentary cinema that tries to produce knowledge from here. Sobchack 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? film share. It may 
sound as if the eye of the film is swallowing our vision but the main thing to be 
understood is the fact that the seeing here includes our sensual project as well as the 
???????????????????????? 
 
??? ???? ??? ???????? ??? ?????????? ?????????s arguments before passing to the next 
part. First, film watching is an embodied act and requires a doubled embodiment 
relation and this relationality forms at the same time its own hermeneutics. Second, 
expression and perception have a dialectic relationship. This dialectic between them 
is experienced in the lived-body with an intrasubjective and intersubjective quality. 
Finally, the experience of film watching is dialogic; that is, it is a bilateral process of 
seeing and sign production. In short, accordi??????????????????????????????????????????
no longer a passive recipient of the optical information reflecting on the screen and is 
perceived as a bodily being. This body-subject is surrounded with the sound when 
watching film and it is senso-motorically, somatically and affectively attracted to the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ??????? ??? ??? ??? ???????? ?????? ????? ?????? ??? ??? ????? ????? ???????? ?????? ?????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
complex affecting larger masses in a longer time periods when compared to the one 
???????? ????????????? ????????? ???????? ????ver, at least in the light of a 
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philosophical study about how this machine-body worked, we can now open the 
ways to find how we can dominate the apparatus itself.  
 
?????? ??????? ??? ??? ??? ??? ???????? ??????????? ??? ??? ??????????? ????? ???????? ???
refreshed our minds to understand better how the theories, which try to understand 
seeing, subject and object, body and mind and the external world and the internal 
world by separating them from each other, create predicaments at which points. 
Understanding the world in the relationality of the bodies is like a revolution for the 
history of thought. However, we need to produce new conceptual tool-boxes in order 
to exemplify these understandings in practice. Yet this paradigm itself is the 
precursor of the fact that these concepts will come out from the exact experience but 
not only from intellectual capacity of mind. The process of producing meaning and 
knowledge is not far from this conception and points to an epistemological change as 
M. Ponty ????????? ???? ???????????? ??????????????? ???????????????????????????? ????
the extent that what I say has meaning, I am ???????????????????????? ????????????????
speaking; and to the extent that I understand, I no longer know who is speaking and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????  
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 4. F R O M I M A G ES T O ID E AS: O BSE R V A T I O N A L C IN E M A AS 
A W A Y O F N O N-W O RD-B ASE D F O R M O F K N O W IN G 
 
??? ??????? ?? ????? ??????? ??? ?? ???? ??? ???????
images: first, someone actually seen, within 
touch, sound and smell in the darkness of a 
viewfinder; a memory, sometimes elusive, 
sometimes of haunting clarity; a strip of images 
in an editing machine; a handful of 
photographs; and finally the figure moving on 
??????????????????????????????? 
?David MacDougall, Transcultural Cinema  
 
 
4.1. Theoretical H istory  
 
In his book F ilm Theory: an Introduction through Senses Thomas Elsaesser 
investigates the question of the relationship between the cinema, perception and 
human body, and discusses the earlier distinction between two theoretical approaches 
to the cinema as formalist and realist film theories. Formalists focus on the form of 
the film in terms of construction and composition whereas realists emphasize on the 
transparency of filmic medium allowing for a direct relationship to reality (Elsaesser, 
2010:3).  Although they call attention to different aspects of film experience, for 
Elsaesser, these two positions resemble each other in their treatment of vision as 
disembodied because of its reduction to visual perception (Elsaesser, 2010:8).  For 
?????????? ?????? ???????? ??? ????????? ???????? ????????? ????? ???????? ?? ???????? ?????
cinema as window and frame ?the first of our seven modes of being (in the 
cinema/world) ?is ocular ?specular (i.e. conditioned by optical access), transitive 
(one looks at some-thing) and disembodied (the spectator maintains a safe distance in 
???????????????????? (Elsaesser, 2010:14).  Actually, by making this differentiation, 
Elsaesser also gives the historical background of how the film experience has been 
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understood for a long time in the history of cinema. The spectator does not have a 
direct involvement in the filmic event and also the filmmakers construct the structure 
of the film with a consciousness of producing a theatrical vision. Film is not more 
than a thing which can be contemplated. Thus, seeing by being reduced to an optic 
mechanism becomes the instrument of the mind, which can connect images to each 
other and can form their memory rather than being an extension of the body. Further, 
?????????? ????????? ????? ????????? kino-glaz, who is a formalist, to this tradition. 
???????? ??????????????????????????????????? ???? ????????????l dissociation of filmic 
seeing from the insufficiencies of human perception, i.e. the absolute, triumphal 
(optical) victory of film over the limitations of human senses and the world they 
???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????istory of cinema 
that the appearance of the camera in the streets and so its gain a movement with an 
attribution to the relativity theory cannot still escape from the ocularcentric paradigm 
which accepts vision by breaking up its relationship with other senses and 
prioritizing it. Even the emphasis that the feminists of 1960s and 1970s put on 
voyeurism, fetishism and exhibitionism was not enough for challenging this 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????? ???????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????-pravda, overshaded the body under the 
pursuit of a panoptic film understanding. When making cinema the tool for thinking, 
seeing is perceived only as an organ of the visual perception and constructing the 
world of meanings is again subdued to a process inside the skull. Kino-glaz wishes 
for an Alephian seeing; the camera seeing the world from all angles will liberate us 
from the single-angled vision of the body. Thus, the reality will be captured through 
frame as much as possible and the captured objectivity will fall down on the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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been constructed before the spectator sees it and minds capable of solving the codes 
will contemplate a given idea. This idea is not much different from the representation 
theory that Descartes pioneered. We are still in pursuit of a correspondence 
relationship between the objects and their mental images. The spectatorial distance 
between the seeing eye and the seen object is still preserved. Cinema in this sense 
embarks on a scientific quest with a Cartesian perspective. Vertov believes in the 
objectivity of cinematographic apparatus, which is a cinema that takes as its subject 
?????????????? ????? ????????????? ????????????????????????????? ???? ?????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ??????????????? ??????????? ?????????? ??????????? it still creates a realism in 
?????????????????????????? ??????? ????????????? ??????????????????? ????? ????????? ????
capacity of the image to give an unmediated, transparent and objective truth is 
intertwined with a kind of naturalism. By replacing the human eye, camera provides 
the true vision of reality. This approach established on the idea of a pure cinema 
??????????????????????????????????? of cinema as something constructed. As Barthes 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-sufficient, that it is strong 
??????? ??? ????? ???? ????? ??? ???????????? ??at its enunciation has no need to be 
??????????? ?????????????????????? ????? ???????????????????? ?????????????????? ??????? ?????
???????????????????????????????????????????(Barthes, 1978:134). Thus, Bazin positions 
film on the basis of its direct relationship to the world of reference and montage in 
this relationship is accepted as evil. We watch the world, as a window disclosing 
over reality, with a transparent eye that vanishes in our perception after some time. 
The reality reflecting on the screen disguises itself into a pragmatic shape that 
passivates the spectator; the world is documented but by being fed from the belief 
that the gaze watching the world from across has for the objectivity myth. The 
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???????? ??? ???? ?????????? ????? ?????????? ?? ???????????? ?????ience is described. 
Although the film as being merely a visible object takes the life-world as its subject, 
participation of the spectator is left outside at the point where the intellects are 
active, where they construct the meaning world of the film. The spectator becomes as 
a mere recipient; he is now the reader of representations. Here Cartesian separation is 
at work; with Vertov the constructing I, the knowing eye and the seeing eye is 
blessed and with Bazin the reality existing outside of me independent from me is 
????????????? ????????????????? ??? ????????????????????????????? ???? ????????????????? ???
crystallized and becomes absolute with Bazin. The common thing in both is the fact 
that the film is capable of providing the true vision of reality.  
 
Naive realism in documentary cinema, until the development of the sync sound 
technology in 1960s, imposed itself not only on cinema but also on the social 
sciences, which tried to turn the documentary cinema into a scientific method. The 
fragmented structure that montage created was avoided, depth of field was blessed 
and it became the very thing for the long take more scientific which is realistic 
document. Until the scientific methods of Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson that 
were combined with the technology of cinema saved the film from the ambiguities 
caused by the fiction film and other traditions of the literature of imagination, 
especially the intention of anthropology was not respected by the dominant cinema. 
However, the ambiguity between the fiction and nonfiction availed to the 
consolidation of the classical theories of social sciences and thus for a long time the 
use of visual material as scientific tool was refused. Until Mead saw the camera as a 
research tool in a field work in 1930s, film was seen only as an illustration of already 
observed, analyzed and defined scientific data through the field work before. That is, 
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the images were seen as the explanatory examples of the introduced theory. The 
images could not move ahead of the objective conceptualizing of science. With 
?????? ????? ???? ????? ??? ?????? ??? ????????? ???? ??????? ????????? ???? ???????????????
notice during direct observation and the social phenomena that remain without 
conceptualization in language and is eluded. However, the Mead effect was not 
different from the Bazin realism and it had a kinship with the dominant theory of 
??????? ????????????? ???? ??????? ???? ????????????? ????????? ??? ???? ????????????????? ???
reveal more reality??????????????????? In this way, science would double its reality 
effect by avoiding the subjective intervention and objectifying. There is on the one 
hand a direct connection which the film provides to reality owing to the ontological 
claim of the photograph creating a material presence and on the other hand a 
scientific discourse with the unerring absolute eye reinforced by the written 
language. Thus, the raw material that cinema presents for science is abstracted, 
verbalized and translated to statistics with the methods like the ones applied to other 
data. With the revolution in portable sound equipment, the world of the documentary 
film heard for the first time the voices of authentic cultures themselves on which 
films were made since that day. Until this technological improvement, the general 
method was to explain the things through voiceover with third-person commentary, 
which is a method still used today. The discovery of a subjectivity existing outside 
the commentator became one of the things that are dug under naïve realism. Films 
are directed from the public to the private, from the general to the private and from 
the typical to the unique and the social phenomena, which the analyses understood 
by continuously dividing, gained autonomy along with the spatio-temporal unity. 
Jean Rouch was the one bringing the freshest interpretation to this change with his 
reflection on subjectivity in his films that he made during this period.  He refused the 
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cinematographic observation methods and he criticized the beliefs of realism and the 
traditional ethnography that transparent images of a positively knowable world can 
be produced. Thus he introduced the relationship of the subjects with the filmmaker 
along with the discovery of the speaking subject who was the subject of these films. 
On the other hand, by making the ethnographic film a political issue he criticized the 
voyeuristic look of the ethnographer, which supports the dominance of his ways of 
????????? ????? ?????? ?????????? ?????? ???? ???????? ??? ????? ??? ?????????? ???? ???? ???
very often with a feeling of disgust, the very fruit of that intellectual imperialism 
which comes from the fact that we can only see others with our own eyes and with 
???? ?????????? (Rouch, Jean, 1990:40). Acquiring this ethical position for a desk 
worker social scientist seems hard when the methods he uses are considered. It seems 
even harder for the positivist approach, which is used to reducing the life-world to 
statistics and to linguistic generalizations lost among the surveys, to understand this. 
The reasons for this can be searched either in his laboratorized studies or in the fact 
????? ???? ??????????? ????? ??? ???????? ??????????????? ???????? ???????? ??? ????? ?? ??????????
????????? ??? ???????????????????????? ?????? ???? ???????????????????? ?????? ??? ?????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? of cinema. The idea of 
observing the world without the intervention of the subject is combined with the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
was increasing the level of neutrality of camera by keeping the camera at a fixed 
position and by using a tripod without allowing any intervention.  Cinema could only 
reach the objectivity of science in this way. The formation of the visual anthropology 
in America after Mead happened by way of teaching the same method. T????????????
gaining the characteristics of moving required the changing of its subject and 
relationship but this required the changing of its understanding of subjectivity. This 
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would also change the definition of the scientific observation because it functioned 
as the alienating domination of the Western gaze on the authentic cultures as an 
extension of the colonial mind until then. As Trinh T. Minh- Ha once pointed out 
????? ?????????? ????????? ?????????????? ??????? ???? ???????? ??????????????????? ????????
(Min Ha, 1982:3). The developing of the consciousness that indigenous 
???????????????????????????? ?????????????? ??? ??????????????? ?????? ???? ???????? ???
living beings as the Western people, has taken a long time. After all, the thing 
making the Western mentality think that native people, who were the subjects of 
????????????????? ?????????????????????? ????????????????? ???????? ??????????????? ??????
own voices. In this sense, this was the domination of speaking to the existence. The 
fact that this approach, which considered seeing a priori to other senses, at the same 
time finds the written language more scientific and acceptable than the visual 
language are closely connected to each other. It was believed that images are 
incapable of presenting a logical system within themselves and that they lack a drive 
for clarity. Visuals did not have meanings in themselves unless they are situated in a 
written theory. Because thinking has been understood as a separate universe 
disconnected from its object which is reduced to the codifications of the written 
language until a very recent time. This situation was the dominance of the 
logocentric system of thinking and at the same time a tyranny of written discourse 
along with the disbelief against senses at the level of information production. 
Ignoring what it could not conceptualize became the crisis of social sciences because 
enlightened way of seeing that saw the world as ultimately transparent and knowable 
always needed a material which it can marginalize. The existence of other lives, 
which establish similarity with the knowing subject by breaking apart from the 
evolutionary line, encouraged a reflexive way of thinking in science. Cinema Vérite, 
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which adopted the observational method by distinguishing themselves from the 
expository style of documentary film making in the history of documentary cinema, 
???? ???? ???????? ????? ?????????? ???? ???????????? ???????? ???? ?????????? ????????? ????
filmmaker and the subject. The direct cinema that found supporters, on the other 
hand, by hiding the realism of the observational method and the presence of the 
camera from both the subject and the audience, thought it will reach cinematic truth. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the problem was not to show the audience that truth was reached but on the contrary 
to problematize the accessibility of the truth.  
 
The notion of observation seems to be the centre of the problem when the history of 
cinema, which turns around realism, is considered. The connection of realism to the 
notion of truth was going arm in arm with the will to make the world clearly visible, 
??????????? ???????? ??????? ????? ??????? ??? ???? ??????????????? ??? ????? ??? ???????? ???
seen as an entity independent from the intervention of the subject, it would cause 
??????????????? ?????????????? ????? ?????????? ??????????? ???? ???????? ?????? ?????
mastering the world. Realism perceived the things as objects as available at hand, 
which Heidegger also stated, by accepting the reality as given outside of me. As 
?????????? ??? ???? ?????? ???????????????? ???????? ?????? ??? ?????? ????????? ??? ???????
there present before my eyes is, after all, attributing the object objectivity from the 
start. The only thing that needs to be done was to embed the technological system, 
which will give the true vision, in the best way to theory. In this way, I would be 
reaching its knowledge. This knowledge would be the core of the object of 
knowledge. In short, this understanding is interested in the whatness of objects, not 
in how they are. When Rouch tried the participatory method in making his films, he 
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tried to describe the world as in our relationship to it instead of taking the truth claim 
??? ???? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ????? ?????????? ????? ???????? ?????????? ????
participatory concept????????????????????????? ??????????????? ??????????????????????
Although the method of participatory observation is disputed since Mead, it could 
get an importance only after 1980s. The effort of observation to diverge from the 
spectatorial distance, visually or not, was shaped as sharing the daily experiences of 
people by entering into their natural environment and getting closer to the 
perspective of the subject as much as possible despite their outsider positions. This, 
at the same time, became the initiator of self-reflective thinking and was seen as a 
way of having a more humane point of view. Big-brother type of vision gave way to 
more distributed points of view and caused the revelation of the mutual intertwined 
relationship of the subject of the film and the film making; that is, a revelation of the 
knowing subject which always remained invisible behind the camera. The observing 
eyes watching the world without intervention from where they stand, realized that 
they produced films as being a part of the thing that they take as their subject in the 
world, in other words they realized that they construct knowledge. Rouch says that 
???????? ???????? ????????????? ????? ?????? ???? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ????
construction of a wholly different object. It is this that has always appealed to me 
????? ?????? ???? ?????? ???????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ??????? ????????? ?????? ?????
assumption lied the changing definition of seeing; as M. Ponty indicated, objects are 
from now on do not exist before me as things present before me but they begin to 
??????????????????????????? ?????? ????????????????????????? ????????????????????? ??? ????
????????? ?????????? ?? ????? ??????? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ????????? ??? ???? ????????? ???
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? of the fact that 
I work not to see these more true and more perfect but I work in reference to the 
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distances that the changing affections between us determine. Within the 
observational cinema, which set about to produce tools that can be used to break the 
subject-object differentiation of the surveying thought, the attention was taken to the 
process of production itself. Because they began to understand the practice that they 
thought to be lying within theories when the problem turned out to understand the 
subject and object interaction. David MacDougall is one of the leading people in this 
field. Doing his first field work with his wife Judith MacDougall in East Africa, he 
has produced texts on the observational method with the experience that his films he 
made until recently earned him. His privilege in being a subject of this thesis is the 
fact that the epistemological perspective, based on his understanding of seeing within 
the theory of cinema, resonated with phenomenology. In the previous chapter, we 
saw that film viewing challenged the classical film theories at points, where the body 
is considered, when looked at a phenomenological aspect. MacDougall, on the other 
hand, calls attention to film making activity itself from a phenomenological 
perspective by taking the body to a central point within the theorizing efforts of the 
observational cinema.  
 
4.2. Epistemology 
 
MacDougall in his book The Corporeal Image (2006) makes a phenomenological 
description of the images and image making; his aim is to emphasize on their 
corporeal aspect. He takes this idea to developing a general understanding of 
ontology with his point of view. His emphasis on the pre-reflective experience 
????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
reach more general abstractions and meanings, direct experience precedes these 
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meanings. These meanings are closely related to the material existence of experience 
until we are separated from these physical encounters within this experience. He 
does not term this process with the differentiation of pre-reflective and reflective but 
?????????? ???????????? ??? ????????????????? ???????? ?????????????? ??? ???? ?????????
unity of pre-reflective experience. Just as M. Ponty constructed his ontology with the 
flesh in this phase, MacDougall also calls this state being. It is clear that he is in an 
effort of going against a world where thinking is separated from the matter. Because 
he talks about a phase of thinking which is lost among the abstractions in the next 
phase of thinking but before which matter and feeling are bound up. In short, as in 
M. Ponty, there is a consciousness that had existed before the conscious reflected on 
itself and produced linguistic thinking. And for him, the act of knowing starts at this 
point. He ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ?????? ??? ??????????? (MacDougall, 2006:1). MacDougall says that when my 
consciousness reflects on my being, it does not represent itself with an image on its 
own; that is, consciousness is not a field of representations. On the contrary, it 
requires priority of my bodily existence because the trace of the first experience I 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
including seeing as the disclosure of being. Thus, seeing gives us the being of things 
along with the appearances of them. Here, MacDougall emphasizes on the existential 
side of seeing rather than their being as physical processes. Similar to Sobchack, he 
sees science and art as the efforts of understanding the others living with us. Seeing 
for him is equivalent to making science and art; then, he suggests that first we should 
understand what seeing is otherwise it is not possible to do these. However, in this 
effort, meanings form the necessity conditions that shape our seeing experience but 
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on the one hand these meanings can also turn into the prejudices that prevent our 
understanding the world.   
 Meaning guides our seeing. Meaning allows us to categorize objects. Meaning 
 is what imbues the image of a person with all we know about them. It is what 
 makes them familiar; bringing them to life each time we see them. But 
 meaning, when we force it on things, can also blind us, causing us to see only 
 what we expect to see or distracting us from seeing very much at all. 
 (MacDougall, 2006:1). 
  
 
At this point we can make such a conclusion that according to MacDougall meaning 
is not a product of an inner talk of intellect that consciousness does itself. As both a 
determiner and a result of the experience they are formed in the experience. All the 
meanings coming from our subjective history are determined within our embodied 
encounters and sometimes despite them. Then, meanings are not things which exist 
there with its being in itself outside the consciousness and to which the 
consciousness goes to and accepts as true at the time when it corresponds. Meanings 
????? ???? ??? ???? ??????????? ???? ???? ??? ?? ??????????? ????????? ?????? ????? ????
MacDougall talks about a world of meanings outside the linguistic categories that the 
academic language was used to until then. According to him, our conscious 
experience is not arranged by resembling to language; that is, it includes thinking and 
thoughts of different kinds that are not merely a result of reasoning. Accordingly, 
images may include or cause the thinking resembling language but they contain more 
??????? ????? ?????? ?????????? ??????????? ?????? ???? ??? ????? ??? ??? ??????? ??????????
???????? ??????????? ???? ???? ????????? ??? ???? ????????????? (MacDougall, 2006:2). 
Therefore, how we use, create and understand the images maybe is not something we 
can understand by using the words. Here, this question can be suggested:  as the 
thing what MacDougall calls as thoughts extending the language can be understood 
on the ?????? ?????? ???????? ?????????????? ???????? ??????????? ???? ???????????? ??? ????
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????? ????? ??????????? ??? ????????? ???? ????????? ??? ???? ??????? ?????? ????? ????
conscious thought differentiation, may be separating the thought unlike to the 
language from that on the basis of this dualism. The reason is, M. Ponty in the end 
tries to understand the basis of every kind of thinking by founding it on the embodied 
experience; in his theory higher language such as speaking and writing are in the end 
based on the bodily existence. But the things he suggests on seeing, how he 
understands seeing point to the fact that he tries to make the conscious thinking with 
the other kinds of thinking exceeding this thinking as M. Ponty did. What is more, 
this closeness is an ontological o??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??????? ?????? ?? ??? ????????
philosophy resonates within the scope of the reversibility of the internal and the 
external on the basis of the thoughts in embodied experience. MacDougall tries to 
diverge from the understanding which accepts thoughts only on the basis of the 
impressions that the external object create on us. Images, for him, are the most 
obvious indicator of this. Along with seeing, we see that images draw a different line 
in the forming of knowledge: 
 
By treating images ?in paintings, photographs and films ?as a product 
of language, or even a language in themselves, we ally them to a 
concept of thought that neglects many of the ways in which they 
create our knowledge. It is important to recognize this, not in order to 
restrict images to nonlinguistic purposes ?this merely subordinates 
them further to words ?but in order to reexamine the relation between 
seeing, thinking and knowing, and the complex nature of thought 
itself. (MacDougall, 2006:2) 
 
 
He tries to understand the images constructed on the basis of perceiving the 
experience of the other as material presence and as thinking being. However, in order 
to do so we need to go beyond the mental facility that language provides us. That 
seeing is predetermined both shows the knowledge we acquire with the other senses 
as well as seeing are mainly organized and draws attention to the fact that cultural 
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and neural conditions of seeing are determining factors. Because it has neural 
conditions does not change the fact that when we see, we at the same time see 
conceptually, metaphorically and linguistically. MacDougall connects seeing to the 
tension between two things: the tension between consciousness of meaning and 
consciousness of being.  
As we look at things, our perception is guided by cultural and personal 
interests, but perception is also the mechanism by which these 
interests are altered and added to. There is thus an interdependency 
between perception and meaning. Meaning shapes perception, but in 
the end perception can refigure meaning, so that at the next stage this 
may alter perception once again. (MacDougall, 2006:2) 
 
In this way, MacDougall opens the way of extracting knowledge from within the 
experience via images as realization of consciousness of its own act by means of its 
??????? ???????????? ????????? ?????? ?????? ??? ????????? ????????????? ?? ???? ????????? ???
perception for knowing because when I direct my consciousness on my perception I 
do not observe it functioning as a transparent window disclosing to its object at all. 
My perception directed at the world is closely related with my subjective history for 
the meanings inferred from this encounter as well as the direction when it is directed. 
Moreover, my consciousness shows me in this relationship that other is also a body 
subject and it has intentionality, too, in the sense of the embodied nature of the 
experience. The interdependency relationship that MacDougall finds between 
perception and meaning is directly in parallel with the reversibility relationship that 
M. Ponty constructs between perception and expression. Perception is after all, a 
bodily expression in its origin. The invisible is always a determiner of the visible and 
the vision but has a relationality that will never be completed. The invisible extends, 
expands, shrinks and creates a pattern with the expressions of incomparable value by 
means of the visible. Therefore, arguing that images should not be reduced to the 
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field of linguistics means to extend the meanings by allowing every kind of way of 
expression. Doing science, knowing no longer means to work only with words. 
Along with the changing meaning of seeing, the meaning of thinking also changes 
and extends. If we consider for the film experience, it cannot be limited merely with 
?????????????????????????????? we have reduced seeing to an ocular mechanism and 
have considered the film merely as a visible thing. The same thing is relevant for the 
act of filmmaking itself as well as seeing the images that others produced. 
MacDougall says that meaning is a product of the process of experience, which our 
body participates as a whole; it is not just a product of conscious thought. Thus far I 
understand the thoughts which MacDougall referred with the conscious thought and 
which M. Ponty called as the reflexivity of consciousness; that is, I understand the 
thoughts which the consciousness creates by reflecting on itself. Then, I infer from 
here that MacDougall comes to terms with M. Ponty with respect to the unity of the 
experience in bodily dimension at pre-reflective level.  
 
4.3. Corporeal Image 
 
Under the light of this information, MacDougall states that we see with our bodies 
and the images that we make are the productions of whole body since they carry the 
imprints of our bodies. (MacDougall, 2006:3) Thus, they carry the traces of the 
world of meanings resulted from our intentionality of being of the world. Image 
making is an artifact of our intentionality toward the world.  
They are, in a sense, mirrors of our bodies, replicating the whole of the 
??????? ?????????? ??th its physical movements, its shifting attention, and its 
conflicting impulses toward order and disorder. A complex construction such 
as a film or photograph has an animal origin. Corperal images are not just the 
images of other bodies; they are also images of the body behind the camera 
and its relations with the world. (MacDougall,  2006:3) 
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MacDougall understands film making in its relation to the wildness of being as 
??????????????????? ?????? ??????????????????????????????? ?????? ??????????????? ????? ???
the prereflective embodied nature of language in a similar vein. Filmmaking is an 
activity that has its own intentionality with the participation of the technology of 
apparatus which is the black box as Flusser says and it is a bodily experience 
standing on the edge of the visible and the invisible until the consciousness reflects 
on it. In fact, even if the consciousness reflect on itself and produce a reflected 
thought, if we look from the perspective of phenomenology, bodily encounters 
underlie this reflexivity in any case since for phenomenology it is not possible to 
understand our existence without consideration of our being in the world. Even if we 
intend to link two different ideas and consider their psychic status, we should remind 
ourselves that these ideas origin in the engagement of our bodies with the world. M. 
Ponty states that when we reflect on our existence, what we encounter is not a 
???????? ??? ?????? ??????? ???? ??? ????? ??????????????? ??????? ?????????? ???? ????????????
with the world. This idea provides a rich conceptual ground for MacDougall as well 
as Sobchack. With this strong intuition inspired by phenomenology, Sobchack thinks 
that thoughts and language centers film viewing as an activity of body and 
MacDougall accepts that thoughts and language underlie holding a camera and 
directing it to the world as a structuring structure. It should be noted here that 
experience precedes language. MacDaougall accepts that looking with and without 
camera can never be the same. (MacDougall, 2006: 7). Even if camera mimics 
human vision, images produced by it are different from the experience itself , i.e. 
their materiality. MacDaougall has a different understanding of image than Bergson 
since he thinks that images are always about something but the reality is not, that is, 
????? ???? ??????? ??????? ????? ?????????? ???????????? ?????? ???????????????? ??????? ????
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ways of framing the world. We signify the world, describe and even judge the world 
by framing MacDougall says. The frames orginize our visions, they operate alike 
???????? ?????????? ??????? ??? ??????? ???????? ???????????? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ???????
focuses on something and zoom it by extracting it from the background. Assume that 
you see ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
directed to a group of peasants is intending toward a pair of shoes belong to one of 
peasants and fasten on them. This opens up a horizon in my frame that is more 
promising than listening his opinion on what their life is like via an interview. A 
horizon about pe??????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
experiences. These shoes are transformed into figures in our perception within their 
material presence and if you prefer, a story about rural life with its socio- economic 
reflections on the subjective history rings in our minds at the same time. The thing is 
that, this story does not communicate with me only with my vision, I find my body in 
shoestrings and their form of tie; on a piece of mud or a hole; or a pair of shoes that 
is glossed. I touch, sense and feel with my eyes. My eyes do not operate on their 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????
??? ????????? ??? ???? ????????? (Bergson, 1988:131) Before reflecting on my 
intentionality, the dialectic between subject and object, perception and expression 
has already started to take place from the first moment of my encounter and the 
???????? ??? ??????? ???????? ???? ???????? ?????????? ??????? ??????? ???????????? ??????
framing becomes a new language with the things that are included and not included 
within it. Yet this language depends on the materiality of its own, filmmaker and also 
the subject to which the camera intended. If the shoes do not see me, I can not see 
them. My hands see these shoestrings much more than my eyes, which ties them 
?????????? ????? ???????? ????? ????? ???????? ??? ??? ??????? ???????? ???????? ????????
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
their realtions to other things within the frame, that is, commonalities among them 
and the details escaping my notice in the case of seeing without a camera. Framing 
makes clear not only the visible world but also the invisible world that is beyond 
framing such as intensifications and reinforcements on the percepted thing based on 
???????????? ????????????????? ???? ?????????? ???????? ??? ???????? ????? ?????????? of the 
person who holds the camera. ??????????? ??????? ???? ????? ??????? ?? ???? ?????? ??????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????acDougall does 
not want to leave the examining of how our body relate to other bodies to aesthetic, 
psychoanalitic ve political theories since films can not be reduced to the systems of 
signs and symbols. This would be ignorence of our sensous relationship to films. 
???????????? ???????????? ?????????? ??? ?????? ???? ????? ??????? ???????? ??? ????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ???? ?????????? ???? ?????????? ????? ??? ???? ?????????? ????????????? ????????? ??is 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
identitiy ?as the person who exists outside the film, in his or her own being; as the 
person constructed through interaction with the filmmaker; and as the person 
cons???????? ????? ?????? ??? ???? ????????? ???????????? ????? ???? ??????? ?????????????
1999:29) For MacDougall, filmmaking is not only a process of reception rather it is 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????pragmatic 
language of ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
other bodies influence ours, we also reach out and enrich them with our own 
???????????? ????????????? ????????? ?????? ???? ?????????? ????????? ????? ????
interworld among self, other and film ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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????? ????? ??????????? ??? ??????????? ??? ????????????? ???? ????? ???????? ?????????????
conception of film is based on the idea that film proceeds by implication rather than 
demonstration, that points to a different form of thinking. Film already includes the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
subject for observational cinema alike self is bounded up with the world. Ethics and 
aesthetics are interdependent in the film since the aesthetics is the expression of 
???????????? ??????. (Taylor,1999:3). Our perception of ourselves and other are 
interconnected since we have commonilities as living beings in the same world. This 
is the intersubjective structure of perception as M. Ponty says. We are not face with 
selfhoods infinitely seperated from each other. Thus, by reason of subject is both 
seeing and seen, there is a mutual constitution between self and other. MacDougall 
criticizes that the conception of naive realism makes this relationship unidirectional. 
He emphasizes key position of body:  
???? ??????? ???????? ?????????????????? ???? ????? ?????? ?????? ???? ????????????
gaze touches ?and it is touched by ?what it sees. A film can be said to look 
and to touch. Filmmaking requires interactios of the body with the world in 
registering qualities of texture and shape, which do not exist abstrctly or 
independently of such encounters. The world is not apart from, but around 
and within the filmmaker and viewer. Touching is not a one-way process but 
reciprocal, in the sense that an equal pressure is applied to what is touched 
and what is touching. (MacDougall, 1999:49-50) 
 
MacDougall gives direct refere????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ??? ????? ????? ???? ??????????? ??????? ??? ????? ?????? ?????????? ??? ?????? ?????
experience depends on that we have a paralell sensory experience with other bodies 
as being intersubjective condition of experience. One of the most preliminary ground 
for this intersubjective experience is gesture as M. Ponty emphasized. There is a 
reciprocity between our intentions and ot?????????????????????????????????????????????
be reduced to a cognitive operation. Similarly MacDougall thinks ????? ???????? ???
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given (gives itself) to the viewer, inviting particular emotions of commitment and 
????????????????????(MacDougall, 1999:51) For him, human face is a good example 
for that. Face is like theater of body. When we recognize a face, we witness to 
???????? ??????????? ?????? ????? ???? ????? ???????? ????????????? ???? ???????????
?????????????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ???? ?????? ????????? ???????? ??????????? ??? ???? ????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ??? ??????? ???? ???????? ?????????? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ???????? ???????????
???????????????? (MacDougall, 1999:52) It is worth quoting at this length from M. 
Ponty: 
No sooner has my gaze fallen upon a living body in process of acting than the 
objects surrounding it immediately take on a fresh layer of significance: they 
are no longer simply what I myself could make of them...I say that it is 
another person, a second self, and this I know in the first place because this 
living body has the same structure as mine. I experience my own body as the 
power of adopting certain forms of behaviour and a certain world, and I am 
given to myself merely as a certain hold upon the world: now, it is precisely 
my body which perceives the body of another person, and discovers in that 
other body a miraculous prolongation of my own intentions, a familiar way of 
dealing with the world. Henceforth, as the parts of my body together 
????????? ?? ???????? ??????????? ???? ???? ?????? ????????? ???? ??????????? ????
sides of one and the same pehnomenon, and the anonymous existence of 
which my body is the ever-renewed trace henceforth inhabits both bodies 
simultaneously. (Merleau Ponty, 2002: 353-54) 
  
For MacDougall, the syncrony between the viewer and the film subject is mediated 
?????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that ??????? ??? ??? ???????? ??? ??????? ???????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ??? ?????? ????? ??? ?????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????physiological and 
biological level just as lexical thought thought can only be observed when it is 
verbalized. In her book The Skin of The F ilm (2000), Laura Marks says that body is 
source of not only individual but also cultures.  
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MacDougall thinks that it is like a trance to film a subject for the filmmaker and for 
???? ?????????? ??? ??? ?? ??????? ???? ??? ?????????????bodies in the film. In this point, he 
??????????????? ?????????? ????? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ????? ????????????? ???? ???????
implies a passive form of vision that scans a subject or preserves it in some 
impersonel sense, looking implies a more selective, intentional activity, a search for 
??? ??????????? ????????????? (MacDougall, 1999:242) Thus, the idea here criticizes 
??????? ???????????? ????? ??????? ??????? ??? ?? ??????? ???? ??? ??????? ??????? ????? ??
certain perspective. This is not an attentive look. This criticism suggests to look in a 
humane distance rather than ubiquitousness of the camera in space. Thus, filmmaker 
see the filmsubject from a social distance as a result of an interaction with it. 
MacDougall points out that film is a form of looking before expressing ideas in a 
form of communicaiton.  
When we look, we are doing something more deliberate than seeing and yet 
more unguarded than thinking. We are putting ourselves in a sensory state 
that is at once one of vacancy and of heightened awareness. Our imitative 
faculties take presedence over judgement and categorization, preparing us for 
a different kind of knowledge. We learn to inhabit what we see. Conversely, 
thinking about what we see, projecting our ideas upon it, turns us back upon 
ourselves. So, simply to look, and look carefully, is a way of knowing that is 
different from thinking. (MacDougall, 1999: 7) 
  
Here, MacDougall suggests a different epistemology of the mutual relationship 
between observer and observed, of which description is difficult linguistically and so 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
teach social science. The knowledge is lived before entering the system of linguistic 
categories and becomes the product of this lived experience. Thus,  MacDougall says 
????????? ????????????????????????????????? ?????????? (MacDougall, 1999: 6)The reason 
for the ignorence of attentive look is too much conceptualizing of the world for 
MacDougall. This can be applied to filmmakers as well, many people can not have 
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an unconditioned look at things. MacDougall says that this is because of ?????????????
??????????? ???? ??????????? ??? ??????????? ????????? ??? ???? ???????????? ????????????
??????? ??? ???? ????????????? ??????????? ??? ???????? ? ??????????? ?????????????
emphasis suggests to learn looking by going beyond the limited education of the 
eyes.  
 
4.4.Text vs. Image 
 
The problem is here not actually privileging of concious thought, rather it is ignoring 
prereflective form of thought as if the world of meaning is not established on the 
realtionship between the world and our bodies. Films call us to look at the world 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
we have never seen are familiar to us. Because as MacDougall emphasizes, images 
reawaken our prelinguistic bodily habits sinking into oblivion within us and so we 
can engage in a cultural world unknown to us before. The thing that makes us to 
understand them is primarily our embodied existence rather than conceptual tools 
that we develop to understand them as M. Ponty says that understanding acts along 
with the imagination and the senses. (Merleau Ponty, 2002: notes. 231) Film does 
this by merging into its subject rather than an statistical analysis at a distance. Films 
encourage our the power of imagination since for already the most part of our 
perception of reality is derived from imagination as MacDougal points out. He states 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a heightened sense of space, volume, and texture. What we see and hear taps into our 
prior experience of the world and situmulates the imaginative capacity that most of 
???????????? ???????? ??? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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????????? ????????????? indicates that films generate a form of thinking through 
bodies by blurring the line between imagination and reality. Hence, the ways of 
scientifc inquiry based on the textual tradition becomes the target of his criticisms 
due to their ignorence of imaginative forces. He complains about that even if they 
uses different voices in their texts, the writings of social scientists especially British 
ethographies do not provide any component which can stimulate visual imagination 
while they are descibing social phenomena. For this reason, even if they describe 
material surroundings of the cultures subjected to their inquiry, their description does 
not go beyond an arid list of components. Text lacks of multisensory context. For 
MacDougall, this has been inherited from the enlightenment. The mentality of 
enlightenment that tries to make all visible the world purifies its language by sorting 
out all the sensual details since it aims to achieve clear and distict ideas in th highest 
level of expressions. The scientific discourse imposes an optic seeing in the sense 
that it has no temporality and organic engagament with world. According to 
MacDougall, the most significant common characterictic between descriptive writing 
used by science and cinema is to create sense impressions on spectator or reader and 
to leave the rest to imagination. They have also common methodologies in that they 
create fragmented realities. Even though some scientists dream of panoptic image of 
????????? ????? ??????? ???? ??????? ????? ?? ??????? ???????????? ??? ???? ?????? ?????
MacDougall. Thus, film has a fragmented structure too by means of changing 
perpectives of the camera and juxtaposition of different images through editing. 
??????????? ???????????? ? ???? ??? ????????? ???? ?????????? ????? ?????????? ?????????
analytically, constructing a new reality out of fragments, seeing it as much with the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????
emphasizes on the fact that human vision is limited to the perspective of its situated 
 76 
b?????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ???????? ??? ????????????? ???????? ??? ????????? ????????
However, we can operate by taking place of the perspectives other than ours thanks 
to spatiality of perception just like the camera can change its position accordingly 
??????????? ???????????? ??? ??? ????? ??? ???? ???????????? ???????????? ??? ?????????? ??????
fragmented realities in film. Both they have linearility in that sense. However, 
whereas writing gives the coordinates of another world by progressing cumulatively, 
the content of the film is constituted as compositely. MacDougall thinks of film that 
???? ?????? ???????? ???? ??????? ??? ?????? ?????????? ???? ????????????? ???? ??? ??? ????
interrelationship of these that are often more important than the components of the 
???????????????????????? (MacDougall, 2006: 37) This refers to a main difference of 
film comparing to text, that film makes us to experience the events simultenously as 
we experience it in daily life, however, we do not feel in such a way while we are 
????????? ??????????????????ike a train journey, linearity in writing tends to project a 
sense of movement in the direction of copmletion (of a sentence, of a narrative), 
which in academic writing assumes the magisterial quality of a movement toward 
???????? ? ????? ????????? ???? ??? ????king in Western thought may be related to the 
emphasize on the quest for causality in the world. For this reason, scientific 
description is linear and deals with causal narratives of the things subjected to the 
examination rather than their existential nature. This scientific description is not what 
M. Ponty suggests in his method of phenomenological reduction rather it is the 
method of science obsessed with objectification of the reality. Thus, it does not 
???????? ???? ???? ?????????? ????????? ???? ?????????? ?ntervention into the object of 
examination considering its inherence in knowing. For this reason, Macdougall 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
than telling us, in a voice of a writer, a film presents us with a series of scenes. 
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Unless there is a spoken commentary, the narrative of a film is always something 
???????? ?????????? ?????????? ????????????? ?????? ???? ?????????? ??? ?????? ?????????
visibility in text begins with Da Stendhal and Balzac considering novel. MacDougall 
adds to this idea that scientific texts have no visiblity within them until very recently.  
For him, social science inherits visibility from cinematic conception. W.J.T Mitchell2 
???? ??????? ????? ??? ??????????? ?????? ??????????? ?????????? ????????l, 1994, as cited in 
MacDougall, 1999:49) MacDougall thinks that films have lead to question existing 
??????? ??? ?????????? ???????????? ??? ???????? ???? ??? ????? ????? ???? ??????? ????????????
curiosity to find new ways of expressing sensory and social experience. Before this 
change in social science, images are reduced to codes of textual language in 
scientific discourse as we mentioned above. The begining of the raising interest in 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????se 
linguistic focus of post-war structuralism, poststructuralism, deconstrcution, and 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????- criticism on its 
methodologies and the shift in research topics has indicated the inadequacy of 
descriptive ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the experience of individual and so the research areas such as the role of the senses 
and emotions in social life and the cultural construction of gender and personel 
identity has became effective. This should not be understood as just a formal shift in 
its methodologies. This is also foreshadow of an epistemological paradigm shift. The 
relationship of social scientist to the subject has been changed at first. Thus, the 
interaction between them has been accepted as one of the components of knowledge 
and no longer a problem for science. Film making is not simply a note taking as in 
field research without a camera. It requires to participate the experience of subject. 
                                                 
2 ???????????? ??????????????????????????? ????? ???????????????Picture Theory.  
 78 
That the bodily encounters become a variable of knowing by changing the form of 
knowledge supports the claim that our knowledge of the world is something to be 
constructed. The change of axis in Anthropological ways of seeing and knowing 
turns the representation itself into a problem of science. Thus, the science of future 
requires to make more research on representational systems of film, video, and 
photography. For instance, although that the visuality has the capacity of metaphor 
and synesthesia has been institutionalized long time before, it takes time for social 
sciences to take advantage of these qualities. The reason of that is the regimes of 
thought which seeks for an objective view of the world purified from creativity in 
scientific discourse refusing aesthetical poins of views. Yet as MacDougall 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2006: 222) Thus, metaphor is understood as something to provide the 
interdependency between self and world, body and mind and images have the power 
to reveal it since the world around us associated with our feelings, actions and mind. 
In this respect, if film frees itself from the demands of textual tradition, it can 
develop its own language. 
  
4.5. Observational C inema as a Medium of Ideas 
 
The development of visual culture in social sciences is closely linked with becoming 
of the body a site of meaning. After social scientists have started to participate 
directly to the experience observed rather than playing an intermediary role, the 
language of social sciences has accomodated itself to this and accordingly Passive 
voice has been transformed into active voice and the past tense into present tense. 
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This applies to disappearence of body-mind dichotomy as well as the redefined 
meaning of subject-object dichotomy. Thus, this transformation has animated the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
they are living as well as its language and ways of thinking. This is embodiment of 
knowledge. Since as MacDougall points out that science duhumanize the study of 
humanity when it seperates itself from lifeworld. In the case of film, this shift applies 
to include the realtionship between observer and observed as well as the presence of 
the camera in the film and to consider that the knowledge coming out of the film will 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
evidence of this experience of intercommunion and a denial of all other possible 
???????? ??? ???????? ??? ???? ???????????? ??? ???????????? ???? ????? ??????????
intentionalities and it is included both the knower and the known in the knowledge 
and we have also a chance to observe how it is included. Besides the material 
presence of the subject in its representaion adds value to the content. On the other 
hand, a door left open to the spectator for subjective participation and interpretation 
to the extent of his/her intention???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ??? ??????? ???????????? ??????????? ??? ??????????????? ???????? ??? ?? ???????
beyond observational cinema indicates the transformation of cinematic language and 
also epistemological paradigm in scientific discourse. This attempt of  theorization in 
observational cinema is significant in respect of showing the ways of thinking and 
knowing through images. If we understand ??????? ??? ?????????? ?????????? ???
encounter with the prelinguistic world of thought which is not reduced to codes of 
language. Thus, we see that thought is something emerging from experience 
underlying reflected thoughts. The world is the plane of immanence consisting 
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bodily realtions, expressions and perceptions intertwine within experience and so 
there is neither transcendent thoughts nor a transcendent self . The world is not a 
given reality rather it is the thing we experience.  The expressions of our experiences 
emerge from this plane of immanence, they are not products of only a mental 
process. The body is the house of memory and establishes our relationship to world 
with the things which is visible and also invisible to us. The perception never gives a 
knowledge purified from memory. Thus, it always includes our subjective 
experiential history.  The world or the other will never be completely knowable. 
However, as long as we believe the possibility of this, the world will be an 
uninhabitable place for h?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is a forgotten call owing to the fact that ?????????????????????????????????????????????
world completely knowable. Merleaus Ponty makes a similar call with his 
phenomenological approach. The world of experience is transformed into a closed 
circular system of informations today. Both of these philosophical approaches imply 
the need of a fresh look that will make us think of our ignorance about the 
qualifications of our bodies and the potential of images. Objectifying gaze of western 
thought leads to a form thinking that transcends its object and the eyes that can 
criticize this transcendence is blinded by this form of thinking itself. Images can 
prompt us to turn back to the object even with a ground that allows for rediscovery of  
our unique subjective lives. Understanding of other is not something possible without 
a consideration of body that is the network of perception, senses, emotions and 
thoughts. As Ulus Baker3 once said that a visible affection is not something other 
than an idea. If we understand images in that way, films can be another way of 
thinking, feeling and communicating with other bodies. 
                                                 
3 See his writings on http://www.korotonomedya.net/kor/index.php?gundem 
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     5. C O N C L USI O N  
 
The research question of this thesis has been the possibility of thinking and knowing 
through images. For this aim, I have focused on phenomenological approaches that 
allow us to examine film experience in respect of perception and the relationship 
between thought and body. I have believed that we would not understand the cinema 
that tries to think and produce knowledge through images without turning our 
attention to seeing as senseous perception related to the first moment of our 
encounter with images. By concentrating on the film theory of observational cinema, 
I have tried to figure out epistemological paradigm shifts with respect of their 
reflections on understanding of images. This axis has included not only theoretical 
aspects of image making and the act of viewing but also their practical constitutions 
intertwining with these theories. According to the study of cinema from a 
phenomenological approach, film forms a multisensory pattern constituted by the 
??????? ??? ???? ?????? ???? ???????????? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ????? ??????? ???? ????
??????????????????Film is not something only audio visual just as my body that is not 
consisted of only eyes and ears. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
bringing about thinking, reflecting a thought or thinking by itself. On the contrary, 
when we talk about thoughts, we already in the area of our embodied experiences 
consisting our all bodily encounters within the lifeworld. This suggests to understand 
thoughts via bodies without enclosing them into only intellectual activity. Ideas do 
not lose their connection to their bodily origin in prereflective dimension even if they 
are linked to each other  and constitute a montage. When they are expressed and 
communicate with us, they connect us with the other subject-body expressing his/her 
ideas by means of the mutual bodily realtionship between them. Correlatively, it is 
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my body first to welcome film as a reflected thought in its relationship to me. 
Thoughts and perceptions are interdependent. The priority of knowledge immanent 
in experience rather than the idea of transcendency of truth claim in our 
epistemologies will reconnect us to the lifeworld. In respect of this, the approaches 
based on unity of subject and object, mind and body has been the focus of this thesis. 
 
In the second chapter, I have aimed to give a sense of what disembodied vision is by 
means of an analogy to Aleph as all-seeing-??????????????????????????????????????????
that the knowing eye understood as disconnected from its bodily being transformed 
????? ???? ???? ??? ?????????? ??? ?????? ??? ???????? ???????????? ???? ?????????? ???????s 
experience is subordinated to mind. This kind of knowing based on the distinction 
between perceptual and intellectual worlds underlies a certain understanding of 
seeing though it lowers senseous experience, that creates an understanding of reality 
that is completely knowable and so can be controlled by bringing about an 
ocularcentric interpretation of the world. This view privileges seeing comparing to 
other senses because of its interconnection to the intellect. I have pointed to 
Cartesian philosophy as the peak of this understanding because of the fact that this 
view of seeing as the eyes of mind is intensified in the subject transformed into self-
knowing autonomous agent by cartesian body-mind distinction and leaves sensuous 
experience out of the door.  
 
??? ???? ?????? ???????????? ?????????????????? ???????? ?????????? ????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
not leave the platonist tradition of rationalism. By emphasizing on intentionality of 
c????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-body 
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continuity and accepts seeing in its relationship to other senses. Objectivist and 
subjectivist approaches seems to be far from understanding the place of the body in 
the field of experience because of the fact that they attiribute absoluteness 
correspondingly to the object or the subject itself considering perception, thinking 
and producing knowledge. His philosophy provides an existential  ground to 
understand perception and thought, which accepts existence as being in the world. 
The relationship between self and world or other emerges as a product of bodily 
affections and mutual relationship of them. The body unites conciousness and the 
world. The unity in the prereflective dimension of experience and the conciousness, 
which has the capacity to reflect on experiences and its own activity, underlies 
thinking and knowing. M. Ponty emphasizes on intertwining between perceiver and 
percepted by describing a state of conciousness in absence of linguistic. He unites 
????? ???? ??????? ????? ???? ????????? ???? ???? ??????? ??? ????????? ????????? ????
epistemology derives from the ontology of flesh; he overcomes the understanding of 
subject of which rationality is given priority by accepting a mutual relationship 
between them. Whereas seeing is understood as a model of thought and reduced to a 
mechanistic process for Descartes, it gains existential meaning and accepted as an 
embodied experience for M. Ponty. For him, our bodily existence is lived, materially 
and historically situated and finite. Lived-body subject condemened to meaning since 
the perception itself is a lived expression. Thus, for M. Ponty, thought as an 
expression emerges from the first moment of encountering with the world. The 
languag?? ???? ???? ??? ???????? ??? ?? ??????? ????????? ??? ???????? ????? ???? ???????
engagement in the world. Thus, M. Ponty manifests his rejection of the views 
seperates thought from body. The method of  reflection in his philosophy shows us 
that the field of experience is something of which description is never completed 
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conclusively. The world is not a place of closed meanings and the truths which 
generate them. Therefore, he rejects the understanding of seeing, which is originated 
in ocularcentrism and associated with classical science that seperates reason and 
sense experience, and accepts that vision emerges from the relationship between the 
world and the body which is both seer and the seen. Under the title of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
????????? ??????????? ?????? ?????? ??? ??????????? ????? ??????????? ??? ?????????? ???
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
film viewing as a result of an embodied relationship between the viewer and the film 
for I have believed that this can provide us a conceptual ground for a better 
understanding of observational cinema from a phenomenological perspective. 
According to Sobchack who tries to describe and account for the origin of cinematic 
signification and significance in the experience of vision as an embodied and 
meaningful existential activity, pragmatic language of embodied existence creates an 
interworld among the filmmaker, the spectator and the film itself. Film is the 
expression of the body-??????????? ?????? ??? ??? ???????? ??????????????? ????????? ??? ????
lifeworld. Thus, film is a perception which is already expressed and for this 
reversibility between them is originated in the body, the body becomes the source of 
thinking and communication. M?? ????? ??? ????? ??? ????????? ??????? ???? ?????????
similarly film is not only a visible object, it is both seen and seeing and it has 
intentionality as well. Film experience with its world of meanings is product of this 
reciprocity, both film and spectator are embodied and mutually enworlded. By 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Sobchack shows that 
we establish a mutual relation with other bodies by means of film and participate 
their perceptions and intentions.  
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In the forth chapter, I have examined observational cinema as a breakthrough in 
???????????? ??????? ???? ????????????? ??????????? ????? ????? ??? ?????????? ????????
experience and produce knowledge from it. I have argued that this style has an 
embedded phenomenology in it and it ?????????? ????? ??? ???????? ???? ?????
??????????? ?????? ??? ??????????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ??? ????? ????? ???????? ????
filmmaking. I have dwelled on the problems of observational style from the 
perspective of phenomenology in the first place and then focused on David 
????????????? ???????????????? ???????? ??????? ???? ???????????? ?????????? ??? ?????
cinema and the social sciences. MacDougall thinks that we see with our bodies and 
the images that we produce carries the imprints of our bodies rather than being a 
product of only concious thought. His idea that meaning is produced by whole body 
?????????????????? ???????? ???? ??????????? ??????? ???? ????? ??? ????? ??????? ???? ????
only images of other bodies but they also consist of intentions of the body behind the 
camera confirms what Sobchack says about the interworld among the filmmaker, the 
spectator and the film itself. Images lead us to a dimension that can not be reduced to 
linguistics. In this respect, MacDougall suggests participatory cinema beyond early 
examples of observational style, which provides a new epistemological insight for 
social scientists. For him, knowledge based on bodily experience consisting of 
interactions of bodies, that is, the interaction of subjects and objects. The moment of 
arising of knowledge which is what MacDougall calls ?????????????????????????????
?????????? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ??????????? ??? ??????????? ??????? ?? ?????????? ????? ????
meaning emerges from experience and consists the interconnection of matter and 
feeling before they are abstracted. This refers to the origins of thinking and knowing 
which M. Ponty describes as prereflective thoughts unreduced to linguistic 
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categories. Cinema neither an opening to objective reality independent from the 
subject as realists assume nor a panoptic image of a disembodied eye as formalists 
accept. Images are not only an object of vision; they carry traces of emotions, bodily 
memories and reflected thoughts.   
 
As a result, I have tried to clarify the subject matter of this thesis by synthesizing 
theories from different research areas though they deal with similar problems after 
analyzing them in detail. The initial question of this thesis is whether it is possible to 
have a different conception of thinking through images or not. In the course of this 
study of phenomenology, I have pointed out that returning to body and 
understanding it with its existential being can provide this difference and this 
conception can form a basis for reexamination of the process of knowledge 
production. Phenomenology is often to blame for naturalizing human perception and 
consciousness. However, I believe that returning to phenomenology with an attentive 
reading can lead us to reevaluate this argument. Since I believe that the attempts of 
theorization that get lost within reflected thoughts and intertextual researches ignore 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
encounter with the world. The entering of camera to our lives is significant for not 
only showing us inaccessible things to human eye and so making visible the invisible 
but also how we perceive the world and think.    
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